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The problem of violent extremism is approaching a critical point in America. 
American government and community leaders must find an effective approach to 
deterring violent extremism immediately. A national and comprehensive approach to 
deter violent extremism in America is currently lacking. This comparative policy 
perspective seeks to determine whether the United Kingdom and Australia have good 
practices to deter violent extremism that can be useful in America. Secondly, this thesis 
also seeks to determine whether the United States can implement potential good practices 
to deter violent extremism. After a thorough review of the issue of violent extremism in 
America, this thesis studies similar background, research, and violent extremism issues in 
the United Kingdom and Australia. This thesis concludes that a variety of good practices 
in the United Kingdom and Australia can counter radicalize and deter violent extremists 
in America. The findings and recommendations from this research include challenges and 
a way forward to implement certain potential best practices for the United States. The 
arguments offer viable options and alternatives that the United States should consider 
when creating a national deterring-violent-extremism strategy. The details and 
information regarding understanding and implementing good practices to deter violent 
extremism in America are contained in this thesis.  
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The Boston Marathon bombing in 2013 caught many Americans by surprise, 
which is the impetus behind the creation of this thesis that seeks to understand the root 
causes of terrorism and how American government and communities leaders can reverse 
this trend. The problem of violent extremism is overwhelming in America. A thorough 
review of the current state of deterring violent extremism and the root causes of terrorism 
determines that the current American national strategy to countering violent extremism 
(CVE) is insufficient at best, and at worst, dangerous. However, many local communities 
around the country are doing their best to create inclusive communities and opportunities 
to deter violent extremism.  
After a careful review of the available research, this thesis seeks to understand the 
issues and problems facing the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia as they experience 
similar problems with terrorism as America does. Key takeaways from the UK research 
finds that the United Kingdom has an approach to prevent violent extremism by trying to 
deradicalize youth through a program called Channel. The United Kingdom has a whole 
of government approach to deter violent extremism that includes the use of police 
officers, educators, and other community members. In addition, the United Kingdom 
attempts to coordinate various agencies in the fight against terrorism.  
The portion of the thesis that studies Australia again understands the history and 
background of violent extremism there, as well as programs and policies that may 
contribute to America’s fight against violent extremists. Unique about Australia is that it 
has a Living Safe Together program that seeks to build community cohesion and shares 
messages of acceptance and tolerance in addition to offering rehabilitation programs to 
former extremists.  
This thesis provides a way ahead for American policy makers by sharing good 
practices in each of these countries that could be implemented in the United States. 
Through this research of both countries, this thesis argues that deradicalization is 
imperative to the fight against violent extremism in America. Next, the messages spread 
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to counter violent extremism must be effective, meaningful, and consistent. If America 
hopes to be effective in deterring violent extremism, U.S. communities and government 
leaders must start messaging and offering training to prevent terrorism from when 
individuals are young. Understanding that humans are fallible, American policy makers 
and community leaders must work harder to include all members of society in building 
cohesion and responsibility. Rehabilitation of former violent extremists would be equally 
important to the effort to deter violent extremism across the country. The issue of the 
internet continues to be an issue. While the research contained within this thesis 
understands the issue, it is important that whatever messages are shared in the open and 
in the media should also coincide with messages and strategies propelled on the internet.  
This thesis concludes that a variety of good practices in the United Kingdom and 
Australia can counter-radicalize and deter violent extremists in America. The findings 
and recommendations from this research include challenges and a way forward to 
implement certain potential best practices for the United States. This thesis recommends 
that fusion centers be used more resourcefully to implement information sharing and 
communication methods from the national level down to the community level, through 
the use of “whole of community” committees. Most importantly, this thesis proffers that 
the creation of a “CVE Czar” would add a layer and level of importance to deterring 
violent extremism and how that new mechanism of government would work efficiently in 
the American apparatus.  
Finally, while understanding that some of the recommendations within this thesis 
are challenging and limiting, more than anything it is imperative to do something soon. 
No one has taken the lead to counter violent extremism in America and that must change. 
The status quo to deter violent extremism in America cannot continue. Americans can no 
longer accept that extremists erode the U.S. way of life and everything for which this 
nation stands. The proposed comprehensive and effective policies and strategies within 
this thesis aim to create a new perspective and fresh possibilities to fight violent 
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On April 15, 2013, two brothers of Chechen descent placed two backpack 
pressure-cooker bombs along the crowded sidewalk during the Boston Marathon. The 
blasts killed three people and wounded 260. The brothers—who were naturalized citizens 
and members of their community in Boston, and who had, by all accounts, assimilated 
well into society—had in fact radicalized over the course of some years, both overseas 
and in the United States. Federal law enforcement agencies had pieces of information on 
the Tsarnaev brothers but never shared it with the local police forces who could have kept 
a close eye on the brothers, which could have prevented this shocking terrorist incident 
from occurring.  
Whether or not the interagency process functions optimally, the larger question 
remains: why did these brothers radicalize and set out to kill and maim scores of people 
who were attending an athletic event on Patriot’s Day in Boston? Those who climb the 
staircase to terrorism1 experience varying levels of frustration, passion, or anger in 
support of their beliefs, as proposed by Georgetown University Professor Fathali 
Moghaddam.2 “In recent decades, rapidly rising expectations, nourished by images of 
affluence and democratic lifestyles spread by the international mass media have fueled 
feelings of deprivation among vast populations, particularly in Asia, Africa, and parts of 
Eastern Europe.”3 Additionally, “having started from the ground floor, where they share 
feelings of frustration, injustice, and shame with vast populations, potential terrorists now 
find themselves engaged in the extremist morality of isolated, secretive organizations 
dedicated to changing the world by any means available to them.”4 Individuals who 
become terrorists oftentimes do so because they feel ashamed, unheard, insignificant, or 
                                                 
1 Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American 
Psychologist, 60, no. 2 (February–March 2005): 161–169. 
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid., 163. 
4 Ibid., 165. 
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unimportant, as proposed by Jessica Stern.5 Still others follow a group or cause that is 
misguided, which can lead to extremism.  
Radicalizing, understanding the root causes of violent extremism, and deterring 
people from committing violent, terroristic acts continue to frustrate and challenge 
America’s law enforcement, government leaders, and the American public. It also 
continues to grab headlines across U.S. newspapers.6 The problem, highlighted by the 
Boston Marathon bombing, continues to prove that extremists want to terrorize the 
unassuming populace in places that before were public territory, free and safe. For 
example, nightclub patrons have been attacked and killed, people in churches have been 
killed, and college students have been killed. The cycle of violence must stop.  
To fix the problem of violent extremism, the kind that exists today, Americans 
and government lawmakers must first understand the issue:  
Terrorism grows out seductive solutions to grievances … But the 
techniques of terror- the deliberate murder of innocent civilians-are 
counter to every mainstream religious tradition. This is why the mission—
the articulation of the grievance—is so important. It must be so 
compellingly described that recruits are willing to  violate moral rules in 
its name.7  
Thus, countering violent extremism (CVE) is “reducing the number of terrorist group 
supporters through non-coercive means.”8 Therefore, countering and deterring violent 
extremism policies should generate a decrease in the number of violent extremists and 
their supporters and yet violent extremist attacks in America continue to occur. Currently, 
the approach that American policy makers, law enforcement strategists, and community 
leaders are taking is not effective enough to deterring violent extremism in societies 
across the country. Other countries have experience in deterring violent extremism.  
This thesis strives to answer the following questions: 
                                                 
5 Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: HarperCollins, 
2003). 
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid., 262.  
8 Will McCants and Clinton Watts, “U.S. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism,” Foreign Policy 
Research Institute, December 2012, 1. 
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• Are strategies and policies currently in place in the United Kingdom and 
Australia that the United States can use to deter or counter violent 
extremism in America? 
• Which of those policies are viable options for the United States to adopt to 
counter violent extremism? Would the United States be able to implement 
these potential good practices? 
A. CVE IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY 
CVE in the United States plays out on several levels, federal and local most 
notably, in ways that do not consistently connect.  
1. Federal Level 
The U.S. State Department focuses its efforts on diplomacy, communication, and 
influence of nations abroad. The public affairs and public diplomacy section of the U.S. 
State Department has a mission to “support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals 
and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing 
and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship 
between the people and Government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the 
world.”9 Influencing and communicating messages through the media can be used to 
deter violent extremism.  
Contained within the public affairs and public diplomacy section is the Center for 
Strategic Counterterrorism (CSCC), which was “established in 2010, the Center for 
Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) is an interagency unit based at the 
U.S. State Department which aims to coordinate, orient, and inform government strategic 
communications activities directed at audiences abroad designed to counter the appeal of 
violent extremism.”10 Developed by the CSCC, the English-speaking 
#thinkagainturnaway campaign seeks to highlight the brutality of terrorist groups from 
Somalia, Yemen, and Syria, and specifically, against the Assad regime.11 Whether it has 
                                                 
9 “U.S. Department of State,” accessed February 8, 2017, https://www.state.gov/r/. 
10 “Counter Extremism,” accessed February 8, 2017, https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/ 
details/id/404/center-for-strategic-counterterrorism-communications-cscc. 
11 Shaarik Zafar, “Western Foreign Fighters in Syria: Implications for U.S. CVE Efforts,” Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, March 14, 2014, 8. 
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been effective is up for debate, according to Rita Katz, “who is the director of the SITE 
Intelligence Group, which studies jihadi extremists’ behavior online.”12  
While the U.S. Department of State has waded into the waters of counter-
messaging with its “think again, turn away” program, more efforts across America’s 
broad government agencies and communities prove that more work must be done to deter 
violent extremists. The #ThinkAgain approach was created to provide a counter narrative 
on social media to terrorist groups, but mainly Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It 
attempted to paint ISIS as bloody, radical, wrong, and disenfranchising to youth, in an 
attempt to counter radicalize anyone who may show interest in supporting ISIS.13  
Other initiatives currently in place to expand counter-violent extremism programs 
throughout cities and communities across the United States include the community 
awareness briefing (CAB). The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which falls 
under the Officer for the Director of National Intelligence, created the CAB. The CAB is 
literally a close-hold PowerPoint briefing consisting of about 20 slides of information 
presented by members of the NCTC to interested parties. The CAB attempts to educate 
citizens on what violent extremism looks like and how they can be proactive at 
identifying what violent extremism is and the tools at their disposal to inform authorities. 
This course also provides parents and community members with information on 
recognizing signs of radicalization and ways they can intervene should they recognize 
these signs.  
Another initiative recently created by the NCTC and the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), is the community resilience exercise program. This joint effort seeks to 
further “improve communication between law enforcement and communities and to share 
ideas on how to counter violent extremism.”14  
                                                 
12 Rita Katz, “The State Department’s Twitter War with ISIS is Embarrassing,” Time, September 16, 
2014, http://time.com/3387065/isis-twitter-war-state-department/. 
13 Anne Gearan, “U.S. Attempts to Combat Islamic State Propaganda,” Washington Post, September 
7, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-attempts-to-combat-islamic-state-
propaganda/2014/09/07/c0283cea-3534-11e4-9f4d-24103cb8b742_story.html?utm_term=.64e7c1819d14. 
14 Nicholas Rasmussen, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs “Cybersecurity, Terrorism, and Beyond: Addressing Evolving Threats to the 
Homeland” (Washington, DC: National Counterterrorism Center, 2014), 10.  
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The DHS also has programs designed to assist state and local law enforcement 
agencies. These programs are aimed at helping law enforcement identify and counter the 
current threat while providing indicators of violent extremism and potential “lone wolf 
attacks.”15 Also, the DHS has “sponsored exercises in seven cities, including Houston, 
Seattle, [and] Durham, N.C., to improve communication between local law enforcement 
and communities to share ideas on how best to build community resilience against violent 
extremism.”16 It is not as if the federal government is not doing everything possible to 
help combat violent extremism, but federal government officials, members of law 
enforcement, and community members need to deter violent extremism more proactively.  
2. Local Government Level 
Pilot programs in large cities engage communities and local law enforcement to 
create conditions to allow conversations to help one another. One example is Minneapolis 
and the surrounding metropolitan area in which Somali refugees are a large portion of the 
population. “The community has faced unwanted national attention after nine Somali 
men from Minnesota were arrested for plotting to join ISIS in Syria. Six have pleaded 
guilty, and the other three were convicted in federal” court in 2016.”17  
For years now, the mayor’s office has been involved in building communities of 
trust.18 Minneapolis leaders hold various public forums where local officials speak 
openly about security issues facing the population. This forum also allows citizens to 
voice their concerns, approvals, or discussion points on security issues. “They have 
trained over 600 sworn officers in the Somali culture, started after-school study 
programs, mentored kids, hosted open gyms and supported female swim and fitness 
classes. Their programs serve hundreds of Somali American children and teens. They 
                                                 
15 Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Trying to Counter ISIS’ Efforts to Lure Alienated Young Muslims,” New York 
Times, October 4, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/us/us-is-trying-to-counter-isiss-efforts-to-
lure-alienated-young-muslims.html?_r=0, 3. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Alexia Fernandez Campbell, “America’s Real Refugee Problem,” The Atlantic,” October 24, 2016, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/the-challenge-of-integrating-americas-refugees/505 
031/. 
18 Richard Stanek, “It Can and Does Happen Here: Somali Youth with Terrorist Ties in the Twin 
Cities,” Police Chief Magazine, February 2011, 48.  
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have built trust, cooperation and friendships.”19 The addition of sworn Somali police 
officers has resulted in creating a more diversified police force with police training 
focused on better community policing procedures.20 Law enforcement’s knowledge of its 
community and at least an attempt to understand its challenges goes a long way towards 
fostering mutual respect and trust. Communities straddle borders, municipalities, and 
jurisdictions with each other and it is up to law enforcement agencies to share CVE 
programs in spite of that diversification. Sheriff Richard Stanek of Hennepin County said, 
“A trusting relationship with the Somali community is a crucial piece in learning about 
behaviors or activities that, when properly reported, will help protect members of the 
community from harm.”21  
Another example of this mutual sustained effort is the Community Advisory 
Board in Hennepin County, Minnesota. “The CAB is a group of community leaders who 
live or work in Hennepin County. The board meets regularly with the sheriff to exchange 
ideas and information on public safety concerns and to consider emerging trends and 
policy issues.”22 Such local initiatives illustrate the importance of the involvement of 
local communities and local assets. The people who live and work on a daily basis in the 
community are best placed to identify anything out of the ordinary. “The local police, 
more than the federal government, have their finger on the pulse of the local community 
from which domestic terrorists may come.”23 The community-led approach promises 
great results to help deter violent extremism in this community. 
CVE programs are neither consistent nor comprehensive in the United States. In 
fact, the programs listed represent most of the few such programs that exist. Despite the 
                                                 
19 U.S. Attorney’s Office, “Building Community Resilience Minneapolis-St. Paul Pilot Program A 
Community-Led Local Framework,” 3, February 2015, https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/file/642121/ 
download. 
20 Greg Barnes, “Seeking Safety: With History of Tensions, Minneapolis Builds Community Trust,” 
Fayetteville Observer, October 27, 2014, http://www.fayobserver.com/news/local/seeking-safety-with-a-
history-of-tensions-between-police-and/article_e9e52cce-1862-52f0-88eb-b0be2190a90b.html.  
21 Richard Stanek, “Countering Violent Extremism: A Community Partnership Approach,” Police 
Chief Magazine, October 2013, 2. 
22 Ibid., 3. 
23 Written Testimony of DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson for a House Committee on the Judiciary Hearing 
Titled “Oversight of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security” (2014) (statement of Jeh Johnson), 2.  
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various CVE initiatives in America, no agreed-upon federal policy or strategy exists that 
can be implemented with local variations by state government leaders or city mayors. 
Greater focus should be placed on an effective national counterterrorism strategy that is 
needed for the future, one that empowers local governments to take action as their own 
CVE specialists. An enabling national strategy gives the states and local governments the 
ability to adapt a national plan to suit their communities. A national plan would be a 
long-term and progressive strategy that would help empower communities to deter 
violent extremism at home.  
A “better” strategy for America includes one in which “good practices” or 
strategies and policies working in other countries are implemented, and trying to 
understand how other programs and strategies would benefit American society. The 
current U.S. strategy of CVE in America is not working. A “good practice” is one in 
which the policy or strategy works effectively to counter, deter, or reduce violent 
extremism. The 2011 National Counter Terrorism Strategy for the United States was a 
broad policy that was not’ useful in practice for different levels of government that could 
use it to shape and implement their own CVE policies or programs. The 2011 strategy did 
not provide a useful foundation for what various levels of government should do or which 
actions they should take to implement CVE programs. American leaders should recreate 
or update the U.S. national strategy to provide a better useful program to counter, deter, 
or reduce violent extremism.  
A “better” approach for the United States includes an understanding of a multi-
pronged methodology, one that tackles sympathizers, radicalizers, and recruiters and 
attempts to dissuade them from violent extremism using communication, messaging, and 
persuasion methods. A “better” approach is one that brings together and integrates 
members of communities and local leaders, in an effort to counter violent extremism, and 
is not merely a top-down, federal approach to solving local issues. “Better” also means a 
flexible, fluid, and workable strategy with proven approaches that can be applied to 
diverse populations at the local level.  
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B. CVE ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD 
The United Kingdom and Australia have proactive strategies in place to help 
prevent radicalization in their respective countries. The United Kingdom has the most 
robust and reviewed strategy in place, called counter terrorism strategy (CONTEST). One 
component of the CONTEST program is called Prevent, which is aimed specifically at 
deterring violent extremism. Australia has a strategy called living safe together. This 
program focuses on creating cohesive communities based on tolerance and resilience.  
As similar western democracies, the United Kingdom and Australia, offer the 
United States many potential programs and policies for deterring violent extremism. Each 
has its pros and cons that can help point the United States in the right direction to deter 
violent extremism in America. These case studies provide the Unites States an 
opportunity to learn from the mistakes and challenges the United Kingdom and Australia 
faced in implementing their strategies.  
The United Kingdom and Australia offer various tactics, programs, and policies 
that make up the overall CVE strategy and this analysis reveals the programs that can be 
effective in the United States. Episodes like the Boston Marathon bombing in 2014, the 
Charleston church shooting in 2015, the Orlando nightclub shooting in 2016, and the pipe 
bomb explosions in New Jersey, as recently as September 2016 prove that such 
radicalization presents a growing concern for American communities and the greater 
public.  
This thesis includes information about what other countries are doing to stop 
terrorism, what works, and what does not, and what these outcomes mean for America. 
Analysis of the countering violent extremism approaches in the two countries described 
provides an overview of what that means to the United States, and delivers best practices 
and recommendations for how this country can move forward in the effort to deter violent 
extremism.  
The research in this thesis does not discuss the legal, civil liberties, or economic 
aspects of radicalization of how American policymakers can counter violent extremism in 
America. In fact, it begins from the position that addressing these issues in this thesis 
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would be tantamount to trying to study the legal implications before truly understanding 
the problem. As such, this thesis focuses on radicalization and preventing it. 
This thesis uses the following format divided into chapters.  
The first chapter discusses the problem, what terrorism is and provides a working 
definition of violent extremism. The chapter continues with an overview of violent 
extremism in America and the roots of terrorism. Next, Chapter I provides research 
questions this thesis seeks to answer and includes a discussion of what the United States 
is doing now, at the federal, state, and local level to counter violent extremism. The 
chapter continues with potential options for community members and concludes with a 
discussion of western strategies to deter violent extremism in America.  
The second chapter of this thesis contains the literature review. This thesis 
provides an understanding of radicalization with a summary of the current literature 
available. Next, Chapter II reviews the perspectives and shortfalls of the national U.S. 
CVE policy. Finally, it shares an overview of western strategies to deter violent 
extremism.  
The third chapter focuses entirely on the UK’s CVE programs and what may be 
useful to the United States. Chapter III includes a review of the current threat in the 
United Kingdom and described the agencies involved in countering violent extremism 
there. Next, Chapter III also continues with a review of the policies that counter violent 
extremism there, which includes the UK’s countering terrorism strategy, the Prevent 
strategy, and Channel. The chapter also discusses what police officers are doing, in 
conjunction with educators and the whole of community, to help deter violent extremism 
in the United Kingdom. The chapter continues with a discussion on radicalization over 
the internet, pitfalls, and perspectives for the United States before concluding.  
The fourth chapter focuses on Australia and the policies and procedures it uses to 
deter violent extremism. The Australia chapter also consists of a review of the current 
threat there and moves into a discussion of what the agencies are doing to counter violent 
extremism. The thesis continues with a discussion of the CVE programs in Australia, 
which includes the living safe together concept. The Australia chapter continues with a 
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discussion of what other members of the community are doing to help combat violent 
extremism and rehabilitation efforts. The chapter follows with a discussion of 
radicalization over the internet, pitfalls, and perspectives for the United States before 
moving into the recommendations chapter.  
The fifth chapter of this thesis discusses the lessons learned from the United 
Kingdom and Australia’s CVE policies that may be of use to the United States. It talks 
about deradicalization, communication and messaging, a whole of community approach, 
deterring violent extremism at a young age, and the use of prevention engagement 
officers as far as the UK case study goes. Next, the chapter moves into Australia’s 
lessons learned including topics on human vulnerability, expanding training for citizens 
and other individuals, and building communities, as well as potential rehabilitation 
efforts. The chapter continues with an overview of lessons learned and possible strategies 
to deter violent extremism from the internet. The chapter discusses the challenges and 
implementation procedures the U.S. government policy makers could perform to deter 
violent extremism.  
The last chapter is the conclusion and connects the discussion from the 
introduction of the violent extremism problem in America to challenges and 
implementation procedures to stop terrorism in the United States.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review is to discuss the leading relevant literature on 
CVE and considers the previously published literature associated with this thesis subject. 
This literature review considers material relevant to radicalization, extremism, policies, 
and strategies recommended by subject matter experts from various types of 
organizations. The chapter describes radicalization and CVE material from a variety of 
sources to include books, newspaper articles, websites, and more to understand the topic 
of radicalization and violent extremism better and to realize where current thoughts are 
on these topics. The literature review concludes with an overview of some of the pitfalls 
and problems faced in America with current strategies and policies in place.  
A. UNDERSTANDING RADICALIZATION AND COUNTERING VIOLENT 
EXTREMISM 
The research on these topics deals a lot with what drives extremists to join 
terrorist groups and conduct attacks, or to become lone wolf terrorists. Jessica Stern 
focuses on the psychology of terrorism in her book, Terror in the Name of God, Why 
Religious Militants Kill.24 This book helps explain the “why” of terrorism; what 
motivates, upsets, and urges violent extremists to continue their treacherous ways. For 
example, Stern says, “[P]oor governance and inadequate protection of civil liberties have 
allowed extremist groups to thrive and to spread the message that the west is responsible 
for their plight.”25 This book also talks about why individuals stay in the fight, continue 
their work, and prosper at doing their “jobs.” In some cases, extremists worked for the 
organization because it was a paycheck and helped feed and house their families. In other 
instances, individuals have a strong belief in the extremist cause. Other times, an 
extremist could not leave a terrorist organization and had to stay in or face death. Stern’s 
work provides a fascinating review of militancy that further adds to the notion of 
understanding the “how” and “why” of terrorists and their violent groups. 
                                                 
24 Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill.  
25 Ibid., 287.  
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Similarly, Georgetown University Professor Dr. Fathali Moghaddam conducted a 
study of terrorists in an attempt to determine what precipitates their radicalization or 
deradicalization.26  
To foster a more in-depth understanding of the psychological processes 
leading to terrorism, the author conceptualizes the terrorist act as the final 
step on a narrowing staircase. Although the vast majority of people, even 
when feeling deprived and unfairly treated, remain on the ground floor, 
some individuals climb up and are eventually recruited into terrorist 
organizations.27  
Once an individual climbs each level of the staircase, they get closer to greater 
destructive terrorist attack planning. The closer an extremist is to conducting an attack, it 
becomes more difficult for almost anyone to be able to intervene to step in to counter 
their beliefs and planning.  
Still, more understanding and further research is required to stop violent 
extremism in America. However, for example, in Maajid Nawaz’s Radical: My Journey 
Out of Violent Extremism,28 he discusses what triggers enticed him to become a violent 
extremist, a terrorist, and what deterred him from continuing those beliefs. For example, 
Nawaz said, “How easy it is for a victim to construct a narrative out of half-truths and 
inspire thousands in the name of righteous indignation.”29 This point of view offers an 
important understanding of extremism from someone who personally explained how and 
why he was attracted to violent extremism.  
Since Nawaz renounced terrorism, he has worked tirelessly to help deter other 
violent extremists and to slow the growth of individuals on the path to violent extremism. 
He created the Quilliam Foundation, an organization that has been immensely helpful in 
contributing to the discussion on deterring violent extremism. Nawaz brings a wealth of 
knowledge and understanding of violent extremism and shares best practices and lessons 
learned with government policy makers, community members, and others. To that end, 
                                                 
26 Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration.”  
27 Ibid., 161.  
28 Maajid Nawaz, Radical: My Journey Out of Islamist Extremism (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2013). 
29 Ibid., 114. 
 13 
the Quilliam Foundation has focused a lot of attention on counter-radicalization methods 
and other non-coercive, potentially effective means of deterring violent extremism in the 
United Kingdom. For example, the organization shared measures about 
counterspeech messaging [that] can be divided into three categories: a) 
content that aims to directly negate and undermine the content being put 
forth by extremism and terrorism-related messaging, b) counter speech 
that positively offers other narratives/alternatives/options and c) counter 
speech which aims to purely inform and provide transparency around an 
issue that is monopolized and/or misinterpreted by extremism and 
terrorism-affiliated individuals.30  
Other helpful academic and think tank organizations, such as RAND, Countering 
Terrorism Center at West Point, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), provide positive feedback and important policy guidelines for the government to 
consider.  
Counterterrorism analysts Will McCants and Clint Watts have worked to persuade 
the American public to fix the roots of the problem of violent extremism. They believe 
that to achieve success in deterring violent extremism, it must also be measured. McCants 
and Watts have provided evidence on the importance of agreeing on “a clear definition of 
the terms ‘extremism’ and ‘extremist;’ and [an] assessment of where CVE efforts are 
most effective … [they have provided a way of] integrating CVE efforts in the virtual and 
physical environments … with an emphasis on predetermined measures of project 
performance and effectiveness.”31 This agreement is key to understanding how effective 
programs can help harness the power of counter-radicalization success but also how to 
measure performance standards.  
McCants and Watts also believe that America’s policy makers can “seek to reduce 
sympathy and support by means that are measurable, low risk, small scale, and narrowly 
targeted on a specific, well-defined audience.”32 They feel that policy makers and 
communication messages should “measure their effectiveness against defined 
                                                 
30 Erin Saltman and Jonathan Russell, White Paper: The Role of Prevent in Countering Online 
Extremism (London: Quilliam Foundation, 2014), 8. 
31 McCants and Watts, “U.S. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism,” 4. 
32 Ibid., 6.  
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objectives.”33 Instead of focusing on too much, too soon, McCants and Watts believe that 
government practitioners should create a limited number of goals and measure 
performance and effectiveness of the programs against those, then move forward with 
more strategies in time.34 McCants and Watts out-of-the-box, creative viewpoints have 
helped to pave the way for government agencies to seek new strategies to deter violent 
extremism.  
In 2009, a RAND homeland security white paper provided an understanding of 
deterrence in counter terrorism but focused more on the international aspects of terrorism 
and suicide terrorism. This study ultimately delivered an overview of deterring violent 
extremism overseas but unfortunately could not’ provide any helpful strategies for use 
domestically.35 The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has created a few helpful 
reports on countering violent extremism in America tailored specifically for members of 
the U.S. Congress and their staffs.36 For example, Jerome Bjelopera discusses several 
elements of the domestic terrorist threat including radicalization to violent extremism, 
lone wolves, how prisoners become radicalized, and provides case studies as examples.  
Other articles from the CRS describe the availability of extremist information 
individuals can access online, which in turn radicalizes and links them with those who 
make plans and confer with others of similar interest online. When it comes to 
community policing in America, Bjelopera states, “An inherent challenge to building 
trust and partnership involves law enforcement investigative activities and tactics that can 
be perceived to unfairly target law-abiding citizens or infringe on speech, religion, 
assembly, or due process rights.”37  
                                                 
33 McCants and Watts, “U.S. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism,” 6. 
34 Ibid., 7. 
35 Andrew Morral and Brian Jackson, Understanding the Role of Deterrence in Counterterrorism 
Security (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009). 
36 Jerome P. Bjelopera, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat (CRS Report No. 
R41416) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013).  
37 Jerome P. Bjelopera, Countering Violent Extremism in the United States (CRS Report No. R42553) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 14. 
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Furthermore, the coordination of CVE at the national level is limited in America, 
and so Bjelopera speculates, “there is no single agency managing all of the individual 
activities and efforts of the plan. At the national level, some may argue that it would be of 
value to have a single federal agency in charge of the government’s CVE efforts.”38 This 
document supports claims of potential deterrence measures and offers evidence for what 
could work better in a range of efforts against violent extremism.  
Other thinkers have highlighted the concept of coordinating CVE programs from 
local government or mayor’s offices in coordination with law enforcement. Some believe 
doing so may help in engaging with the community and gaining credibility, which may 
then open opportunities for intelligence collection. In a Study for the National 
Consortium to Study Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START) article from 
December 2016, the authors shared, “local government municipalities are well positioned 
to elicit a common vision, consolidate partners in an accessible network, and increase 
access to funding and resources.”39  
Alumni of the program at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security at the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) have produced insightful theses in this field of study as 
well. For example, in 2010, Brad Deardorff wrote a thesis titled, “Countering Violent 
Extremism the Challenge and the Opportunity”40 that discusses the policies of 
combatting violent extremism in the United Kingdom. In it, Deardorff focuses attention 
against the backdrop of social identity theory and what that means for combating 
homegrown radicalization in America. Looking beyond federal capacity, some local 
governments understand well their capacity to affect violent extremists.  
Los Angeles Deputy Chief Michael Downing offers state and local law 
enforcement examples by which they can increase their counter terrorism efforts across 
                                                 
38 Bjelopera, Countering Violent Extremism in the United States, 3.  
39 Joumana Silyan-Saba and Alejandro Beutel, “CVE Field Principles for Local Government 
Agencies,” START, University of Maryland, December 6, 2016, http://www.start.umd.edu/news/cve-field-
principles-local-government-agencies. 
40 Brad Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism the Challenge and the Opportunity” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010). 
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America.41 Not many articles share and describe what state and local law enforcement 
officials do in the fight against violent extremism. However, Downing shares possibilities 
for local level law enforcement agencies to do something to deter terrorism, both from 
potential groups and from lone offenders in their communities.  
B. NATIONAL U.S. CVE POLICY: PERSPECTIVES AND SHORTFALLS 
The 2011 White House National Counterterrorism Strategy provides an overview, 
of deterrence, extremism, and terrorism in the United States,42 and is the primary 
counterterrorism strategy for the United States. The Strategy is directed by “efforts are 
guided by core principles: Adhering to U.S. Core Values; Building Security Partnerships; 
Applying CT Tools and Capabilities Appropriately; and Building a Culture of 
Resilience.”43 
Equally generic, the February 2015 National Security Strategy states, “for the 
sake of our security and our leadership in the world, it is essential we hold ourselves to 
the highest possible standard, even as we do what is necessary to secure our people.”44 
The 2015 version does not offer much substance either.  
The National Strategic Narrative (NSN) offers a holistic approach for American 
government agencies and its people who have ties internationally, diplomatically, and 
economically, as an overarching, safer, and more beneficial way of working together and 
looking toward the future. In the NSN, the writer(s), “Mr. Y” propose a more sustainable, 
authentic way ahead for our American government to have integrity in what we say and 
what we do as we try to find more effective solutions for global issues.45 For example, 
the NSN “advocates to achieve sustainable prosperity and security through the 
application of credible influence and strength, the pursuit of fair competition, 
                                                 
41 Michael Downing and Matt Mayer, “Preventing the Next ‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorist Attack Requires 
Stronger Federal-State-Local Capabilities,” no. 2818, The Heritage Foundation, June 18, 2013. 
42 The White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: The White House, 
2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf. 
43 Ibid. 
44 The White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, 2015), 19. 
45 Mr. Y, National Strategic Narrative (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2011).  
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acknowledgement of interdependencies and converging interests, and adaptation to 
complex, dynamic systems—all bound by our national values.”46 
Perhaps with more emphasis on countering violent extremism, a stronger all-
encompassing national counterterrorism plan could empower communities and enable 
them to have a greater role in deterring violent extremism locally.  
  
                                                 
46 Mr. Y, National Strategic Narrative, 5. 
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III. UNITED KINGDOM 
The United Kingdom, one of America’s closest allies, faces similar threats from 
Islamic radicalization as the United States. The British have worked hard to find effective 
programs that fit in their society. The threats to Britons continue to this day and 
government officials, law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and the community must 
continually react and sharpen their efforts to deter violent extremism. CONTEST is the 
British version of a national CVE strategy and one that is heavily relied upon for tactics 
and methods available to the government.  
British counterterrorism has taken many lessons from the history of “The 
Troubles,” as the Northern Ireland conflict is called, a 30-year struggle that witnessed the 
advent of targeted killing and bombings by the Provisional Irish Republic Army and 
ultimately claimed more than 3,500 lives.47 First, the United Kingdom understood that 
the adversaries, the fighters, and those willing to commit atrocities in support of their 
cause were dedicated to their cause. The adversaries clung to their cause and would go to 
great lengths to defend their beliefs and their actions. Second, the United Kingdom 
learned that law enforcement and intelligence agencies must work in close coordination.  
Lastly, the United Kingdom came to understand the influences of soft power and 
hard power should be complementary and closely synchronized, instead of being 
exclusively from one another.48 Soft power means more of a shaping, persuasive tactic to 
change the attitudes and habits of the adversary. Hard power in this reference means 
using the powers of arrest and force to affect the adversary.  
                                                 
47 “The Troubles” occurred when factions within Northern Ireland sought to change (or keep) their 
constitutional status. “The goal of the unionist and overwhelmingly Protestant majority was to remain part 
of the United Kingdom. The goal of the nationalist and republican, almost exclusively Catholic, minority 
was to become part of the Republic of Ireland.” (The longer history of these frictions dates back to the time 
of Henry VIII and English attempts to control Ireland). The conflict lasted until the Belfast Agreement or 
Good Friday Agreement was signed in April 1998. “Troubles,” http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles, 
accessed February 28, 2017.  
48 Magnus Ranstorp and Hans Brun, Terrorism Learning and Innovation: Lessons PIRA in Northern 





The face and focus of terrorism in Britain began to change in 1980, when six 
armed men took hostages at the Iranian Embassy in London, demanding the release of 
prisoners in Iran. Their action was largely overshadowed by the Iran-Iraq War that broke 
out days later.49 This episode is still significant; however, as it marked the first time in 
the United Kingdom that actual live footage was brought directly to the British public 
through their televisions screens with scenes of Special Air Unit forces, or SAS, quelling 
the terrorists during the anti-terrorism operation. Terrorism—and counterterrorism—
came home, so to speak. 
The most notable terrorist attack within Great Britain was the coordinated suicide 
bombing attack on July 7, 2005, by four Islamic extremists with ties to Al Qaeda. Four 
backpacks were used in the attack that occurred in the Underground subway system and 
on a bus in central London. That day, 52 people were killed and hundreds more were 
injured.50 This attack showed the United Kingdom being under direct threat of terrorism 
by radicalized British citizens within the resident Pakistani community within the United 
Kingdom, which had direct geographic, and in some cases, kinship connections with al-
Qaeda in Pakistan. 
A. CURRENT THREAT 
The number of people radicalizing in the United Kingdom is shocking. Islam is 
the second largest religion in the United Kingdom, with more than 3 million followers, 
who represent 4.5 percent of the population. More than 2.6 million UK Muslims live in 
England, while the rest live in Scotland, Ireland, and Wales.51 The number of people 
identifying as white has decreased over the last decade from 94 percent to 86 percent.52 
                                                 
49 “1980: SAS Rescue Ends Iran Embassy Siege,” accessed August 29, 2016, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/5/newsid_2510000/2510873.stm. 
50 “7 July London Bombings,” July 3, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33253598.  
51 Martin Beckford, “Muslims in UK Top 3 Million for First Time ... with over 50% Born outside 
Britain: Number in Country Doubles in a Decade as Immigration and Birth Rates Soar,” Daily Mail, 
January 30, 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3424584/Muslims-UK-3-million-time-50-born-
outside-Britain-Number-country-doubles-decade-immigration-birth-rates-soar.html.  




Islamist terrorism and its recruiting and capabilities are fast on the rise over the last 
decade. This increase is due in part to an increased number of people who feel they do 
not belong.  
The biggest Islamic violent extremist threat to many countries for over a decade 
was Al Qaida. “Al Qa’ida, Al Qa’ida affiliates, other terrorist groups and lone terrorists 
have all been active in the UK over the past two years. They have tried to conduct 
attacks, recruit people in the UK to conduct attacks overseas, raise funds and distribute 
propaganda.”53 Western democracies have not seen such a strong, versatile, and capable 
recruitment threat posed by any other extremist group except for al Qaeda.  
It also owes to the geostrategic decisions that London has made since the end of 
the Cold War. The “Iraq war does appear to have fed grievances linked to violent acts: 
Mohammed Siddique Khan, the leader of the July 2007 London bomb attacks, said in a 
pre-recorded video that the bombers were retaliating against Britain’s role in the invasion 
of Iraq.”54 The increase in individuals angry with the British government and supporters 
of the Iraq War continues to this day. In 2015, more than 3,000 extremists are in the 
United Kingdom. Compared to the overall population in the United Kingdom of just over 
65 million individuals, the threat is greater there than compared to the United States.55 
Those angry at the British government continue to this day as new threats and new 
opportunities for violent extremism grow around the world. For example, “the UK has 
seen an estimated 760 jihadists travel to Syria and Iraq. Some estimates say that half of 
these have returned to the UK, while more than 50 are reported to have died.”56  
                                                 
53 Home Office, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism (London: 
Home Office, 2011), 26. 
54 Larry Attree, “The UK and Extremism: Understanding the Problem and Owning Our Values,” Safer 
World, July 22, 2015, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/news-and-views/comment/181-the-uk-and-extremism-
understanding-the-problem-and-owning-our-values. 
55 Sam Jones, “UK Puts 3,000 Extremists on ‘Jihadi John’ Watchlist,” Financial Times, February 27, 
2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/35a081fa-bea9-11e4-8d9e-00144feab7de.html#axzz4IizShBiR.  
56 Ashley Kirk, “Iraq and Syria: How Many Foreign Fighters are Fighting for ISIL?,” The Telegraph, 
March 20, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/29/iraq-and-syria-how-many-foreign-fighters-
are-fighting-for-isil/.  
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The UK National Counter Terrorism report from May 2015 showed that “in the 
last financial year [April 2014–March 2015] there were 338 [counterterrorism]-related 
arrests, a 33-percent increase on the 254 that were arrested last year. 157 [46 percent of 
the total arrested] were linked to Syria and worryingly, 56 are under 20-years-old, which 
is an emerging trend.”57  
The fact that al Qaeda utilized the internet to such a degree, and made splashy 
colorful magazines online to spread their propaganda, and reached a whole new subset of 
minds to influence and persuade individuals was alarming and unprecedented. For al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the magazines were called Inspire. Magazines 
created by ISIS were entitled Dabiq, named after a key site in Muslim apocalypse 
mythology,58 and has been renamed Rumiyah as a reference to Rome.59 Since the advent 
of Al Qaida, and now the threat from ISIS, terrorist groups continue to threaten to attack 
the United Kingdom and “continue to pose a significant threat to the security of countries 
in Europe,”60 at an alarming rate. A never-ending stream of “wanna-be” Islamist violent 
extremists and their supporters within the UK’s borders inundate a system of intelligence 
specialists, law enforcement, and government bureaucrats.  
Like Al Qaeda before them, ISIS and other terror groups have worked hard to 
delineate the disadvantages of being Muslim abroad and how they are being treated. 
These terrorist groups are placing the ills of being Muslim on their counterparts in the 
United Kingdom. The “Islamic narrative [is] the product of all the problems ailing [the 
Middle Eastern] region at once: underdevelopment, sectarianism, lagging education, 
sexual repression, lack of respect for women and lack of pluralism in all intellectual 
thought.”61 These violent extremists encourage individuals to act and attack the 
                                                 
57 “Latest Counter Terrorism Arrest Statistics Announced,” May 14, 2015, http://news.met.police.uk/ 
news/latest-counter-terrorism-arrest-statistics-announced-116776.  
58 David Harris, “The Islamic State’s (ISIS, ISIL) Magazine,” The Clarion Project, September 10, 
2014, http://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq. 
59 Meira Svirsky, “Latest Issue of ISIS Rumiyah Magazine,” The Clarion Project, October 11, 2016, 
http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/latest-issue-isis-rumiyah-magazine-released. 
60 Home Office, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 32. 
61 Thomas Friedman, “Who Are We?” New York Times, November 15, 2014. 
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“infidels” and other non-Muslims.62 The extremists are creating a wedge between 
communities across the country. They create an in-group versus an out-group that seeks 
to destroy the fabric of what makes the UK communities open and growing.  
B. AGENCY INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
In the United Kingdom, the Secretary of the Home Office oversees 
counterterrorism strategies and deals with the issues faced in the United States as well. 
Appointed in July 2016 by Prime Minister Theresa May, who was the former Home 
Office Secretary, the Home Office is led by Secretary Amber Rudd.63 “The Home Office 
leads on immigration and passports, drugs policy, crime policy and counter-terrorism and 
works to ensure visible, responsive and accountable policing in the UK.”64  
British intelligence agencies are also involved in U.K.’s counterterrorism program 
and aid the policy makers at Home Office in their decisions. An interesting component of 
the British intelligence system is its Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). Similar to 
the U.S. NCTC, the “JTAC analyses and assesses all intelligence relating to international 
terrorism, at home and overseas. It sets threat levels and issues warnings of threats and 
other terrorist-related subjects for customers from a wide range of government 
departments and agencies, as well as producing more in-depth reports on trends, terrorist 
networks and capabilities.”65 The JTAC is comprised of 16 government agencies and sits 
at the British MI5 Intelligence Directorate. It is the preeminent intelligence and analysis 
department in the country. The JTAC is the country’s first and only fusion center that 
                                                 
62 “Young, British and Radicalised: Why People Want to Join Islamic State,” November 17, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/34851049/young-british-and-radicalised-why-people-want-to-join-
islamic-state.  
63 “Ministerial Role, Secretary of State for the Home Department,” accessed September 2, 2016, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/ministers/secretary-of-state-for-the-home-department.  
64 “Departments,” January 12, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/home-office.  
65 “Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre,” accessed September 8, 2016, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/joint-
terrorism-analysis-centre.  
 24 
seeks to be the central repository for intelligence, and therefore, counter terrorism-related 
matters.66  
The JTAC conducts its analysis, which in turn helps to feed the Office for 
Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) and the Research, Information and 
Communications Unit (RICU), which are departments within the Home Office that focus 
their programs and policies to the greater countering terrorism strategy in the United 
Kingdom. Unlike the NCTC in the United States, the JTAC works closely with law 
enforcement agencies to help them understand and stem violent extremism.  
As the main hub for counter terrorism policy within the United Kingdom, the 
OSCT is charged with  
exercising the UK’s response to a terrorist incident, developing legislation 
on terrorism here and overseas, providing security measures and 
protection packages for public figures, ensuring that the UK’s critical 
national infrastructure is protected from attack (including electronic 
attack), ensuring the UK is prepared to deal with a chemical, biological, or 
nuclear release, liaising with government and emergency services during 
terrorist incidents or counter-terrorism operations.67  
The OSCT initiates and supervises the UK’s countering violent extremism program. 
Vitally important, the OSCT is a policy hub is somewhat akin to a cross between the 
American DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). While the 
OSCT is a department within the Home Office, they coordinate the Prevent policy across 
the UK government.  
Established in 2007, the RICU is a cross-departmental strategic 
communications body based in the Office for Security and Counter-
terrorism (OSCT) at the Home Office. RICU aims to link the wider 
government policies to the countering violent extremism program. They 
coordinate government-wide communication activities to counter the 
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appeal of violent extremism while promoting stronger grass-roots inter-
community relations.68  
The RICU is more akin to a government agency that communicates what happens in 
communities, in a sense, perhaps similar to the U.S. Information Agency from 
American’s past, which closed its doors in 1999.  
An important tenet of the RICU counter-messaging program is the use of credible 
voices to deter violent extremism through the use of messaging and counter narratives.69 
Certainly with any messaging and influence operations, a government is going to have its 
opponents. However, when used properly and ethically, communicating through soft 
power using persuasion mechanisms, messages can be especially productive and 
effective, according to the European RAN Centre of Excellence Issue Paper on “Counter 
Narratives and Alternative Narratives.”70  
Just as in the United States, the United Kingdom has issues with individuals 
radicalizing through the internet. “Terrorists have used the Internet to reach a much larger 
audience than has ever been possible for them before and with a broader and more 
dynamic series of messages. Because many parts of the internet are largely ungoverned, 
extremists have been able to circumvent censorship laws and host material on sites which 
are unlikely to be removed.”71 The difficulty in policing every facet of the internet poses 
a problem in that governments cannot get into some of the far reaches of the internet 
where the chances for radical influence and hidden discussions are high and the ability to 
counter the narratives is very low. “Most terrorist propaganda online goes 
unchallenged.”72 A better program to coordinate the effective use of counter-messaging 
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narratives should be created and used often to help deter potential violent extremists and 
give them more positive messaging to consider.  
The National Cyber Crime Unit (NCCU) is new in the United Kingdom created 
under the National Crime Agency in 2013, “leads the UK’s response to cyber crime, 
supports partners with specialist capabilities and coordinates the national response to the 
most serious of cyber crime threats.”73 The NCCU has strong working relationships with 
regional agencies, and local law enforcement, where they share “information, intelligence 
and expertise to enhance knowledge of the cyber threat in order to prioritise operational 
and disruption activity most effectively.”74 This unit promises to enable CONTEST, 
Prevent, and Channel programs on the internet where some of the more serious cases of 
radicalization occur. 
C. POLICIES THAT COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
The UK’s overall countrywide, and global strategy to stem violent extremism is 
its CONTEST program. CONTEST’s policies are based on the “four P’s”: pursue 
terrorists and their supporters through legal means, prevent terrorists and their supporters 
from radicalizing; protect the people within the country and critical infrastructure, and 
prepare by mitigation effects of terrorist incidents.75 CONTEST seeks to work with 
global and intergovernmental partners to help prevent, protect, pursue, and prepare the 
country and its citizens for attacks from violent extremists, either from abroad or from 
within its borders.  
U.K. policy makers and law enforcement officials have worked hard to utilize the 
tools of Prevent to fight violent extremism. Prevent is the most difficult effort from 
CONTEST to perfect; it must be sound in foreign policy, and precise in social, and 
economic goals and policies, as well as attempting to assist all individuals in a country 
filled with many people from various nations. The Prevent portion of the CONTEST 
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program seeks to deter people from becoming or supporting terrorism through their 
counter-radicalization programs. Prevent and its supporters seek to use the concepts of 
counter-ideology, assistance, and the inclusion of help from all types of community 
members to prevent violent extremism. These sectors include mental health, social work, 
community leaders, and the police to guide individuals away from extremism and violent 
extremism, and toward becoming a more inclusive society.76 A close community can 
assist in deterring violent extremism by helping identify people who are going down that 
path to extremism or are vulnerable to radicalization.77 
1. Channel: A Deradicalization Program in the United Kingdom 
Channel is a program that falls under the umbrella CONTEST. Piloted in 2007, 
and officially rolled out in 2012, Channel is a “police-led, multi-agency partnership that 
evaluates referrals of individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism, working alongside 
safeguarding partnerships and crime reduction panels.”78 After going through a few 
iterations and versions, and last updated in April 2015, Channel, as a subset of the UK’s 
Prevent strategy, aims to find, monitor, and persuade individuals from the path of 
becoming a violent extremist or supporting terrorism.79 Channel’s intent is to understand 
who is at risk of violent extremism, the risk such potential extremists pose to society, and 
how to persuade and deter them from becoming or supporting violent extremism. It seeks 
to use a multi-agency coordinated approach to counter the individual’s violent extremism 
to one of becoming a more productive member of society, according to the Channel Duty 
Guidance document from 2015.80  
For example, Channel resulted in the “successful intervention involving a man 
who had been convicted of burglary and who expressed anti-western views in jail. He 
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was also known to have viewed extremist videos online and was referred to the 
programme. After a CHANNEL-backed intervention he returned to education and re-
established contact with his family.”81 Channel has expanded in use and popularity over 
the last two years, specifically. “Almost 4,000 people were referred to the UK 
government’s flagship counter-terrorism scheme last year—nearly triple the figure in the 
previous year, and an average of 11 people a day.”82 This increase has led to about a 20-
percent rate for interventions where more hands-on assistance and attention is needed for 
those people.83 
2. Police Officers 
In the United Kingdom, it has become clear that “communities may be able to act 
as an early warning system for the police and intelligence services should they come 
across information or have concerns about particular individuals or groups.”84 
Unfortunately for law enforcement and intelligence agencies, earlier iterations of Prevent 
made Muslims feel that they were stalked and spied on for information, according to an 
Independent article written by Joe Watts.85 Furthermore, Muslims felt that agencies were 
using illegal intelligence mechanisms to gain knowledge and information on them, their 
friends, and family.86 Architects of the current version of the Prevent program have 
collaborated more effectively with more members of the communities and throughout 
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government to avoid the presumption of targeting and spying on Muslim communities 
through meetings and other coordination efforts.  
By understanding the “beat on the ground” and comprehending communities 
across the United Kingdom, local citizens and authorities alike  
can observe a number of potentially contributing factors [to 
radicalization]: the presence of radicalizers; the spread of global extremist 
narratives; the availability of extremist material; group or individual 
identity issues; personal crisis; changed situation or circumstances; 
underemployment; links to criminality; social exclusion; grievances; and a 
lack of trust in political structures and civil society.87  
From this information, the ability to craft counter messages and deterrence mechanisms 
carefully are more focused and effective. Once effective themes and messages are in 
place, local respected leaders will be empowered with a refined product to spread across 
communities.  
By 2011, the United Kingdom “saw the introduction of Prevent Engagement 
Officers in local police forces, and the creation of a toolkit for schools to use in their role 
in the prevention of violent extremism.”88 The police are crucial in the delivery of 
Prevent in local communities. “At a local level there are over 200 Prevent Engagement 
Officers who connect counter-terrorism policing, neighbourhood policing and 
communities. The police also develop comprehensive assessments of threat, risk and 
vulnerability in local areas that identify priority areas and underpin the delivery plans for 
those areas.”89 
Currently in its third iteration, the latest version of Prevent from 2011 has become 
a softer, albeit a more standardized program with its capabilities to help combat violent 
extremism in the United Kingdom. In the third version, the tactical approaches the United 
Kingdom chooses to use to combat violent extremism include community intervention 
programs, peer mentoring groups, and using non-governmental organizations to 
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disseminate counter-radicalization messages to refute extremist narratives.90 The United 
Kingdom had learned CVE through trial and error. Officials came to feel that they needed 
to expand their counter-violent extremism approach to schools and further into 
communities, much like the anti-drug or anti-gang policy approaches have been in the 
United States, as described in alumni Mike Ward’s NPS thesis, “The Impact of “Duty to 
Warn” (and Other Legal Theories) On Countering Violent Extremism Intervention 
Programs.”91  
3. Educators 
Of note in connection with Prevent is the “strategy [of] placing educators and 
community members in schools and other relevant forums to engage at-risk youth with 
positive messages can be an effective method of CVE, and can leverage the community 
in actively countering radical ideas.”92 Importantly, as stated in the CONTEST strategy, 
“preventing radicalization must mean challenging extremist ideas that are conducive to 
terrorism and also part of a terrorist narrative.”93 Strengthening the counter-narrative by 
speaking of tolerance, resilience, and acceptance, and also of cooperation, could be 
beneficial in communities. By teaching tolerance, acceptance, and resilience in a society, 
in schools, religious centers, and throughout the community, then the need to seek revenge 
against others, and to feel powerful should cease.  
The problem of (potential) violent extremism to such a degree is especially 
relevant to the United Kingdom since, in 2013, an investigation was conducted in 
Birmingham schools that found that extremism and unfavorable religious opinions were 
being taught in the classroom, as reported in the “Report into allegations concerning 
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Birmingham schools arising from the ‘Trojan Horse’ letter,’” in July 2014.94 Now 
serving as Her Majesty’s Inspector of Prisons, Peter Clarke was the investigator at the 
time and the education commissioner for Birmingham schools. In the report, Clarke 
wrote that he “found clear evidence that there are a number of people, associated with 
each other and in positions of influence in schools and governing bodies, who espouse, 
endorse or fail to challenge extremist views.”95 Through education, training, and gaining 
access to the tools to help educators stand up against violent extremism, they are the best-
positioned individuals to be the change. Educators and counselors are all perfectly 
situated to help create a transformation and steer vulnerable youth to more meaningful 
outlets and channels for their issues and problems. The UK Prevent program gets it right 
by enabling the teachers and counselors to help affect change for the better in youth as 
they grow and navigate their way through life in and around school.  
The toolkit consists of information and mechanisms by which educators can 
understand the extremist narrative and model for pupils how diverse views can be heard 
and challenged in a way that values freedom of speech and freedom from harm.96 The 
toolkit also allows educators to help prevent harm by others to and within a school. As 
well, the toolkit addresses how educators can “support individuals who are vulnerable 
through strategies to support, challenge, and protect”97 them and seeks to increase the 
resilience of students so they can acquire skills and knowledge to challenge extremist 
views. The toolkit also promotes the values of respecting others and offers teaching styles 
and opportunities for grievances to be shared so that conflict can be resolved.98 
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4. Whole of Community Approach 
Prevent has changed and grown over the last decade to meet new requirements, 
and different needs and obligations demanded by the citizens in the United Kingdom. For 
example, as stated in the Prevent strategy, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of 
State for the Home Department by Command, “previous work in this area has made some 
progress but has not consistently reached the few people who are the most susceptible to 
terrorist propaganda. It has failed to recognise the way in which terrorist ideology makes 
use of ideas espoused by extremist organisations and has not fully understood the 
implications this should have for the scope of [our] work.”99 As noted, earlier iterations 
of Prevent seemed unfairly to target Muslim populations, which led to animosity toward 
the individuals working to deter violent extremism. Moving ahead, the United Kingdom 
came to believe that, “one of the effects of Prevent [to date] has been the improvement in 
understanding between police and communities in this country on a range of issues, 
including security.”100  
Equally important is the ability to partner with Muslim leaders across 
communities to help communicate messages tailored to those who need to hear the 
message. “A[nother] study found that Muslims welcomed the partnership message, but 
wanted to know what it meant in practice.”101 To that end, in 2009, a telephone and 
internet helpline was offered in the United Kingdom that provided trained Islamic 
scholars to offer advice about the true teaching of Islam.102 The hotline “El-Hatef el-
Islami’s founder, Cherif Abdel Meguid, launched the service in Egypt [in 2000] and the 
UK operation is its first foray into English-speaking countries.”103 
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Authorities in the United Kingdom have come to realize that “local authorities 
should shift their focus and funding away from small-scale community projects which 
they are often ill-equipped to commission towards enhancing their capacity through the 
creation of additional community outreach posts to provide human links between the 
local authority and local communities.”104 The “whole of community” approach has a 
greater outcome, than smaller scale, more minutiae projects in communities that reach far 
less people. “[These posts are] also likely to enhance the quality of commissioning and 
increase the likelihood of reaching the priority target groups.”105  
D. PROBLEMS AND PITFALLS  
CONTEST has not been without its problems and pitfalls. For example, the 
CONTEST strategy of working with various partners and partnerships “continue to 
struggle with the principles and practicalities of partnership with non-state actors on 
matters relating to security and counterterrorism, according to Rachel Briggs in her 
article in International Affairs.”106 To the detriment of the program, it became policy to 
contract out community projects and polls to determine what various communities around 
the country needed, according to the CONTEST Annual Review in 2013.107 Literally, 
contractors from outside of communities were creating programs. Therefore, the nuances 
to communities and the individualistic nature of the programs were lost in planning and 
execution since outsiders were charged with creating the programs. It became evident 
that “local authorities should invest in people rather than projects to build their own 
community knowledge and contacts. They should not commission external consultants—
people who are not usually local to the area.”108  
Government officials believed that a strong CVE program, like the “Prevent 
strategy has been based on the assumption that their ability to deliver is directly 
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proportionate to the amount of funding they receive.”109 The United Kingdom has 
learned that funding should be tied to the following three initiatives to be the most 
effective at countering violent extremism: “deradicalization programmes, the Channel 
process and projects to counter extremism messages.”110  
UK policymakers have realized, “instead of seeking to seed democratic ideals and 
shape Muslim societies in a democratic quasi-Western image, the West’s focus is shifting 
toward protecting its own societies…. No longer seeking to change Muslim societies or 
to influence how Islam is interpreted,”111 The United Kingdom is attempting to use 
funding in an efficient manner to deter violent extremists, not to fundamentally change 
religions.  
Another problem proponents of the Prevent strategy realized was that government 
funding was granted to extremist organizations claiming to be Muslim community 
groups.  
Funding is all too often allocated based on the ability to present slick 
funding applications even though those applicants requesting funding have 
never delivered or worked with the marginalized group they are requesting 
the funding for and have no links or understanding of the needs of that 
minority group. Funds are then allocated with the stipulation that the 
organisation must work with the organisation which is directly linked with 
providing support to that marginalized group.112  
Too many times, this erroneous policy of providing funding to the wrong group led to 
more extremist individuals and groups receiving money under the guise of trying to 
promote collaboration and resilience.113 Such missteps have cost the program some 
credibility, despite its successes to date. 
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E. IN SUMMARY 
Great Britain has experienced varied violent extremist attacks for myriad reasons. 
They have learned lessons the hard way and have been forced to counter terrorism 
through hard and soft power measures. Since 9/11, in particular, and 7/7 more acutely, 
the United Kingdom has seen the threat it, first due to Al Qaeda, and now from ISIS, has 
grown by leaps and bounds.  
Funding will always continue to be an issue no matter where individuals find 
themselves in a country or government. The internet is a whole diverse problem area that 
needs much greater attention than what is provided in this thesis. However, it must be 
understood and reviewed much more closely, despite benefiting from the tools of 
deterrence and counter messaging that already exist.  
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IV. AUSTRALIA 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The greatest contributor to countering violent extremism in Australia is building 
strong and resilient communities. Australia takes a proactive approach, encouraging its 
citizens to become resilient in the face of challenges; the government encourages the 
creation of a stronger, more capable populace. In Australia, and in particular among 
government leaders and communities, a sense exists that “the meanings of resilience vary 
by disciplinary perspective. While there is no universally accepted definition of the 
concept, it is widely acknowledged that resilience refers to the capacity of an individual 
to do well in spite of exposure to acute trauma.”  Despite a fluctuating CVE budget and 
changes in government, Australia is trying to find innovative and effective programs to 
reduce the threat of radicalization there.  
While Australia needs a comprehensive strategic counter-terrorism program, 
current CVE programs in Australia are designed to evoke a sense of “nationalism and 
national identity, particularly in the way its government leaders have] framed policy 
discussion on managing national responses to disasters and threats, has arguably been 
more muted than some of the European hysteria witnessed recently around cultural 
diversity and national life.”  To this end, the Australian perspective that deterrence 
measures can come from building and exhorting a sense of national pride, a national 
identity, and social cohesion, is broadly used to counter violent extremism. 
B. CURRENT TERRORIST THREAT IN AUSTRALIA 
The history of terrorism in Australia can be traced back to 1915, when two men 
fired their rifles on a slow-moving train carrying passengers. Four people were killed.114 
Few, if any terrorist incidents followed this attack until the 1970s, when sporadic yet 
lethal acts of terrorism occurred, often linked to grievances about overseas issues. For 
example, in February 1978, Australia experienced a terrorist bomb attack on a Hilton 
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hotel in Sydney. Despite the horrific act that killed three people and wounded many 
others, no one has claimed responsibility and mystery still surrounds the attack.115 
Believing it was mainly an overseas or outside issue, the Australian government 
perceived that these attacks did not’ much affect them or the citizens and did very little to 
address the attacks. “Little was done to engage the community about terrorism.”116 
A turning point for the government and people of Australia was a series of 
terrorist attacks conducted by Jemaah Islamiyah in Bali, where large numbers of 
Australians holiday. These attacks were judged to be in direct retaliation for the west’s 
war on terror and Australia’s specific involvement in the liberation of East Timor.117 In 
2002 alone, attacks at two nightclubs in Bali killed more than 200 people.118  
Australia experienced its most recent terrorist attack on December 15, 2014. At a 
café in Sydney, an Islamist cleric held hostages while demanding to speak with then-
Prime Minister Abbott.119 Man Haron Monis pledged allegiance to Sunni extremist 
beliefs as posed by the Islamic State and wrote on the day of the attacks, “If we stay 
silent towards the criminals we cannot have a peaceful society. The more you fight with 
crime, the more peaceful you are.”120 His premeditated assault made clear to Australians 
what extremist terrorism on Australian soil might look like. “Monis took 18 people 
hostage…. And… Sixteen hours after he first drew a sawn-off shotgun from a bag and 
ordered the cafe closed, police stormed the building to end the standoff, Monis killed café 
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owner, Tori Johnson, and Monis and barrister Katrina Dawson were left dead following 
the gunfight.”121  
Over the last decade, Australia has experienced more threats from self-professed 
Al-Qaeda and ISIS extremists. Approximately 61 Australian citizens have gone to Syria 
and Iraq to offer support to the latest ideology of ISIS.122  
C. AGENCY INVOLVEMENT 
Australia’s six states and territories have an integral role in supporting the 
nation’s security. The state and territory governments  
• maintain policies, legislation, and plans within their jurisdictions, 
• maintain counter-terrorism and consequence-management capabilities 
within their relevant agencies, 
• have primary operational responsibility for responding to a terrorist 
situation in their jurisdiction, 
• determine prevention strategies and operational responses to threats, 
including seeking assistance from other jurisdictions, and 
• actively consider the requirement for the declaration of a national terrorist 
situation 
• contribute to the national strategy in a national terrorist situation123 
As a country and across communities, these roles ensure that leaders, government 
officials, and citizens are aware of how best to combat violent extremism within their 
boundaries and the commitment it takes to work together.  
Coming from the Attorney General’s office to the aptly named CVE unit, the 
initiatives focus on early prevention training and programs, as well as counter-
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radicalization methods.124 Such programs as “building strength in diversity and social 
participation, addressing terrorist propaganda online, and targeted work with vulnerable 
communities and institutions,”125 help communities foster cooperation, acceptance, 
tolerance, and resilience in the interest of countering violent extremism. Cultural 
competency training is offered, and informal and formal meetings are held to discuss 
issues that affect communities.  
In addition to counter-radicalization, the Australian government works to 
rehabilitate prisoners to be more resilient in the face of terrorist extremists. The 
Australian government “Work[s] with state and territory governments to develop and 
implement programmes to rehabilitate people imprisoned for terrorism related offences, 
as well as prevent the radicalisation of other prisoners.”126 
The government of Australia also hopes to deter violent extremism by preventing 
Australians from traveling overseas to support terrorist organizations abroad.  
The Australian Government has been working towards achieving those 
objectives through activities relating to identification and information 
sharing; motivation, recruitment and containment; referral and support, 
diversion and rehabilitation; education; and communication, as stated by 
the author of the Australian Government Measures to Counter Violent 
Extremism: A Quick Guide, Cat Barker.127  
While trying to understand the root causes of the problem, and by offering holistic 
solutions to deter violent extremists, the Australian government is working toward 
finding solutions that will enable most deradicalization programs. 
Joint counterterrorism teams and joint operations have become the standard 
operating procedure, and have been well established in Australia since 2001. According 
to their website, The Australia—New Zealand Counterterrorism Committee (ANZCTC) 
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has become the premier counterterrorism organization in Australia for multijurisdictional 
cooperation. ANZCTC has attempted to be a useful forum that creates and develops 
national counterterrorism plans and handbooks, offers training and exercise opportunities, 
and acts as a purchasing agent.128 The committee has worked together to develop and 
coordinate policy advice on CVE to governments and sustained and promoted 
cooperation across jurisdictions, which has proved helpful in different types of crises, 
including natural disasters.129  
The eight members of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) 
coordinate counter-terrorism policy in collaboration with intelligence agencies and the 
states and territories. In addition to the prime minister, the ministers for indigenous 
affairs, women, justice, state, veteran’s affairs, and others make up the PM&C.130 Jointly, 
they provide the secretariat for the Secretaries Committee on National Security and the 
National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) terrorism information. The members of 
the PM&C provide information and assistance to the secretariat for the ANZCTC and 
advise the prime minister on matters related to counter-terrorism.131 
The multi-agency body of the Australian Counter-Terrorism Centre (ACTC) 
works closely with the Office of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (OCTC) to ensure 
close coordination and set priorities are focused, evaluated, and consolidated against the 
backdrop of the national counter-terrorism goals.132  
These groups, along with the entire Australian government, share the 
responsibility for coordination and synchronization for the overall effort of countering 
violent extremism in Australia. Each of these agencies is accountable for working 
together and synchronizing efforts to combat extremists and their counterparts. The 
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January 2015 Review of Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Machinery portrayed that 
Australia has come a long way yet still has improvements to make. For example, “The 
ACTC’s focus should be on progress against priorities and overcoming impediments to 
an effective CT approach. It would need to take on an important role in the coordination 
of strategic CT policy across the Commonwealth.”133 This approach is an example of the 
requirement of having measures of performance and measures of effectiveness from 
which to compare the effects of counter-violent extremism programs.  
D. POLICIES THAT COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AUSTRALIA 
The Australian government created a CVE program in 2010. Australia’s 
government has spent a great deal of time trying to integrate individuals into society by 
focusing their time and efforts on community relations and maintaining resilience in the 
face of hardships. “Radicalisation processes are at work in some Australian communities 
and violent extremism is a real and persistent threat to Australia’s security. Australia 
faces threats from violent extremists with a variety of motivations.”134 The diversified 
Australian CVE approach attempts to counter this range of causes and motives. 
1. Living Safe Together 
The Living Safe Together program has essentially become a grant scheme, a 
unique funding approach to deter the growth of violent extremism and to help enhance 
citizens’ ties to the community. Australian grant recipients and community leaders offer 
tools to build resilience, create cohesive networks and communities, and help foster 
creative, innovative solutions to countering violent extremism. Over time, the Living Safe 
Together program became more of a grant-based, funding capability to help counter 
violent extremism in communities, which are the hallmarks of the majority of their 
programs and grants.  
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According to their website, “overall, Living Safe Together seeks to: 
• “Identify and divert violent extremists and, where possible, support 
them in disengaging from violent extremism; 
• Identify and support at-risk groups and individuals to resist and 
reject violent extremist ideologies; 
• Build community cohesion and resilience to violent extremism; 
• Communicate effectively to challenge extremist messages and 
support alternative narratives; and 
• Communities, both through their own activities and in 
collaboration with government, play a vital role in achieving these 
objectives.”135 
In many ways, the Living Safe Together program is similar to the UK’s Prevent 
program. The Living Safe Together initiative seeks to use government and police 
resources to help identify violent extremists and assure their recovery from terrorism. 
However, Australia’s leaders discovered that many Muslim-based communities on whom 
these initiatives should focus on are anti-government and untrusting of the police and 
withheld their support for such programs. 
Australia’s government policy makers have emphasized the use of governmental 
resources over specifically enabling the use of police-specific programs. Communities 
therefore can help themselves by concentrating on programs and grant money to 
community resilience and cohesion in numerous ways.  
The Living Safe Together website136 points to “intervention programs that 
include youth diversion activities, healthcare initiatives, mentoring, employment, and 
educational support programs and counseling options.”137 These measures seek to 
encourage individuals to be confident and resilient against potential radicalization and 
influencing by violent extremists.  
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Underlying the principles of the Living Safe Together program, from 2010 to 
2013, Australia had another program called Building Community Resilience. This 
program sought to provide community members and youth with education and tools to 
identify and understand violent extremism, and the skills to discourage or address that 
behavior. Once individuals become aware to understand and see how detrimental these 
violent extremist behaviors are, the training encourages them to disavow these beliefs and 
ways of thinking. The Building Community Resilience and Youth Mentoring grant 
programs encouraged the engagement of communities and offered intensive training with 
specific tasks to inform youths better.138 These specific tasks focused on peer mentoring, 
community presentations, and community consultations.139 The training and education 
aimed to inform youth about vulnerability, strength, resilience against extremism, and 
similar topics. Thanks to grant funding, the Australian Multicultural Foundation (AMF) 
created a community awareness training manual titled Building Resilience in the 
Community that offers means and ways to build resilience, increase awareness and 
understanding, and promote knowledge and strategies to give people the tools to remain 
social and active in their communities, and is supported by the Australian government.140 
This program seeks to share the ideals of the Living Safe Together initiative under the 
banner of building resiliency in communities.  
An important component to the Living Safe Together initiative is the open-source 
advice provided by the Australian government to assist people in recognizing whether an 
individual is radicalizing. “Advocacy groups All Together Now, Foundation for Young 
Australians (FYA), and ReachOut ran workshops to teach participants how to identify 
and respond to hate speech online, how to leverage their skills as leaders, and how to 
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promote inclusivity and cross-cultural collaboration online.”141 These sources have been 
used as a backstop for those individuals within a community, to provide them with 
information to defend against others who may be curious about what extremist 
organizations offer, but have the fortitude to turn away from radicalization using the 
courage and capabilities that reside within themselves.  
Those who support counter-radicalization efforts recognize early intervention is 
key to offering a range of services and options for at-risk Australians to get the help they 
need. “Communities also play a leading role in rejecting extremist ideologies and 
supporting individuals who are at risk of marginalisation, or who might be attracted to the 
use of violent expression to achieve political, social or ideological goals.”142 The Living 
Safe Together initiative seeks to direct people to services offered by healthcare 
professionals, school counselors, and a range of other social services.  
2. Rehabilitation 
Looking beyond its borders for inspiration, the Australian government has taken a 
hard look at going beyond security and intelligence enhancements to stem violent 
extremism. Mimicking a Singapore policy, Australia has begun a program facilitated by 
the Australian federal police to assess former violent extremists in an effort to rehabilitate 
and remove them as a threat to society.143 Religious mentoring and career counseling 
advice are positive potential initiatives the Australian government is working with to help 
disengage and deter violent extremists and potential extremists from harmful 
activities.144 
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Australia is trying to find the perfect approach to disengage former terrorists from 
recruiting and influencing others into violent extremism. Harkening back to the 
community model and the building resilience theme, a study titled Looking Outward: 
Enhancing Australia’s Deradicalisation and Disengagement Programs, by Kristen Bell, 
addresses these programs and demonstrates that they should be based within 
communities. Recognizing one size does not fit all communities is encouraged to support 
at-risk individuals to enable their disengagement from violent extremism and to embrace 
a better way to participate in society positively.145  
3. Educators 
The Australian government is recognizing, too, the role schools could and should 
play in countering violent extremism and counter-radicalization efforts, which could offer 
some promising results.146 Since education plays such a prominent role in the lives of 
youth, “these education interventions focus on teaching subjects that promote tolerance, 
understanding and citizenship.”147 
As many countries have been experiencing, Australia’s “growing number of 
young Australians radicalising has been the focus of government attention and points to 
the need to address the role of schools.” The theory is that “perhaps some are reaching a 
peak rebellious phase and their impulses are being misdirected into violent Islamist 
extremism.”148 In an effort to stem the growth of violent extremism at schools, school 
administrators and teachers receive training in awareness of what radicalization is, how to 
help deter influential youth away from violent extremism, and what other resources are 
available to help schools persuade students from radicalizing.  
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The Turnbull administration announced in February 2016 an initiative to provide 
teachers in schools with awareness training so they can recognize and help provide tools 
to counter radicalization. This training ties into other awareness trainings provided by the 
Australian Multicultural Foundation.149 In addition to the awareness training for teachers, 
the initiatives for schools include classroom resources by which teachers and parents can 
more effectively communicate. These measures may be the solution in Australia for 
teachers to help combat the increase of young people trying to join international terrorist 
organizations.  
E. PROBLEMS AND PITFALLS  
The mission to counter violent extremism in Australia has been hampered by a 
lack of funding, lack of branding, and a lack of concentrated focus. The fiscal year 2007–
2008 witnessed a peak of $790 million in funding for homeland security and 
counterterrorism efforts in Australia. This number steadily declined to $523 million by 
2013–2014.150 The “building community resilience” element of the Attorney-General’s 
department CVE program, after having been reduced to $7.9 million over the four 
previous years funding was discontinued entirely in 2014–2015. The Australian federal 
police budget has not increased since 2013. That money was allocated for such new 
programs as the Cyber Security Operations Center.151 The ebb and flow of terrorism 
threatening Australia’s borders and their region at times have in turn created an 
Australian government prone to reaction; therefore, generating less strategic oversight of 
their CVE programs. Maintaining a strategic plan but with a reactionary budget has 
prevented policy makers from performing adequate oversight and offering assessments 
that hinders the improvement of current programs and the creation of new initiatives.  
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As stated in the “Gen Y Jihadists” information paper, “no new counterterrorism 
initiatives were funded in the May 2014 budget.”152 However, the Australian government 
allocated an additional $630 million package to boost agency funding on August 5, 2014. 
The money was allocated to increase intelligence resources, improve the security at 
Parliament House, and to boost border security. Additionally, the Australian government 
added another $1.2 billion in the May 2015 budget, which was provided for continued 
operations in Western Asia, to assist telecommunications companies in implementing 
metadata retention, to build new capabilities in the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, 
and to counter online terrorist propaganda.153 While the stop-and-go funding of counter-
terrorism operations in Australia seem reactive instead of proactive, the Australian 
government policy makers and counter-terrorism operations managers continue to try to 
find a balance in providing enough funding in today’s trying economic climate.  
Despite the reactive spending budget for CVE programs in Australia, in 2014, the 
government took a renewed interest in CVE and $13.4 million was allocated to the CVE 
program. The Australian government soon focused its efforts on community engagement 
and CVE intervention programs, as well as counter-radicalization programs that invested 
an additional $22 million.154 
As far as Living Safe Together is concerned, according to Bergin et al., “The 
government has allocated around $1 million for the Living Safe Together Grants Program 
in 2014–2015 only, stating that there will be no further funding rounds available in the 
coming years.”155 Without continued funding, it may not be a sustainable program, one 
which could aid Australian communities to counter violent extremism. “The 
programme’s objective was to support community-based, non-government and local 
government organisations to develop new and innovative services to help individuals 
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move away from violent extremism (either directly, or through their families and 
friends).”156  
Perhaps to the detriment of deterring violent extremism programs in Australia, the 
focus for CVE has been the over consideration of aid and funding various programs. All 
area of government is involved, every agency at all levels, to help combat violent 
extremism in Australia.  
Initially intent on trying to reduce costs and focus money elsewhere, the 
Australian government recognized the value of countering violent extremism and has 
since boosted these efforts. The Australian government has recognized that without a 
proper strategy in place to counter terrorism, resource pressures will exacerbate and 
money will not be used effectively and efficiently.157  
F. IN SUMMARY 
Australia has experienced varied violent extremist attacks at home and nearby, 
from other countries in their sphere of influence. They have learned lessons and counter 
terrorism through hard and soft power measures. They continue to upgrade their 
countering terrorism strategies as extremists continue to modify best practices too.  
Funding will always continue to be an issue no matter where individuals find 
themselves in a country or government. However, it must be understood and reviewed 
much more closely, despite benefiting from the tools of deterrence and counter 
messaging that already exist.  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
There have been more than 40 Islamic extremist terrorist attacks on American soil 
since 2001.158 Most likely all of them could have been avoided. Responding to violent 
extremist attacks in the United States today relies heavily on the use of reactive and 
inconsistent measures including law enforcement and legal repercussions across the 
country. The time has come for the United States to adopt more effective means of 
deterring and deradicalizing violent extremists within this nation’s borders.  
In America, local governments across the country are finding out they cannot rely 
on the federal government to provide them with CVE policies. The federal government 
has been trying to determine who should lead CVE efforts in America, while local 
governments have had to forge ahead to develop approaches that will work in their 
specific populations.  
Local governments’ approaches in places like Minneapolis, Minnesota, and in Los 
Angeles, California, have proven to be effective as they have created enduring programs 
that aim to build resiliency within the community and engage the community members. 
However, only these two cities in this vast country have done anything to deter violent 
extremism that has come to attention in America. The policy measure of coordinating 
from the local leader’s office, as referred to in Chapter I, may lend to new, insightful 
ways to transform the fight against violent extremism in communities across the country. 
Small towns and municipalities have the tools and capabilities among their residents to 
deter violent extremism. Further coordination and communication measures may provide 
an opportunity to create stronger deterrence measures against violent extremists.  
Perhaps, as referred to in Chapter I, Michael Downing of the Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD) stated that by enabling local law enforcement to counter violent 
extremism through community engagement opportunities, and by working and partnering 
with citizens, they might become helpful in deterring violent extremism. He states that 
                                                 
158 William R. Johnston, “Terrorist Attacks and Related Incidents in the United States,” Johnston’s 
Archive, last updated February 4, 2017, http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp255a.html. 
 52 
through better federal and national coordination efforts, as well as with additional 
funding, “they can build resilient communities in which it is harder for this type of threat 
to take root, as well as providing a larger safety net.”159 
A. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Elements of the U.K. countering terrorism strategy, including Prevent and 
Channel, offer the United States a few lessons learned. These lessons include the concept 
of potential deradicalization methods. Prevent and Channel offer the United States the 
way ahead for effective, useful communication strategies to help deter violent extremism. 
Next, a whole of community approach enables all members of a society to play a vital 
role in deterring violent extremism in their communities. It is essential to start to deter 
violent extremism thoughts, beliefs, and ideas when individuals are young and vulnerable 
to messages of extremism and terrorism. Lastly, coordinating prevention engagement 
officers, people dedicated to following up with individuals who may require extra 
attention, may be useful in American society.  
B. DERADICALIZATION IS IMPERATIVE 
The deradicalization process is essential to the fight to reduce violent extremism 
anywhere. As Angela Rabasa of the RAND Corporation said, “Ideally, the goal is to get 
the individual to change his belief system, reject the extremist ideology and embrace a 
moderate worldview.”160 The United Kingdom recognizes the importance of 
deradicalizing violent extremists and is something the United States must focus efforts on 
as well.  
The United States does not currently have a program to deradicalize individuals; 
despite references they have counter-narrative programs through social media. “Because 
counter-radicalization or deradicalization programs are embedded in a war of ideas, the 
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counter-ideological component of these programs is extremely important.”161 In Channel, 
by drawing on the “existing collaboration between local authorities, the police, statutory 
partners (such as the education sector, social services, children’s and youth services and 
offender management services) and the local community,”162 the chances are higher that 
individuals can avoid a life of extremism. Once individuals turn away from violent 
extremism, they become better, more productive members of society. To convince them 
of this better life, it is necessary to communicate effectively what a better life consists of. 
Proper communication will support and enhance the deradicalization of individuals.  
C. COMMUNICATION IS KEY 
The most important aspect to deterring violent extremism is to communicate 
effectively and to use members of a community to help share messages of counter 
radicalization and counter extremism. As Admiral Mullen stated in 2009, “to put it 
simply, we need to worry a lot less about how to communicate our actions and much 
more about what our actions communicate.”163 Communication is key to helping deter 
violent extremism in the United Kingdom. It stands to reason that an effective targeted 
communication strategy to deter violent extremism in the United States can be as 
significant. Without strong targeted messaging, to dissuade individuals from becoming 
violent in the first place, then efforts to deter violent extremism in America will be 
muddled and useless. Not only is communicating a matter for government professionals, 
but for members of society as well.  
Of importance is the concept of “credible messaging to a target audience is best 
created by an equally wide range of credible non-extremist voices coming from civil 
society level. Civil society is best placed to provide counterspeech that both negates the 
extremist message directly, as well as provides counterspeech that can provide vulnerable 
target audiences with alternatives to extremism.”164 Local government leaders, members 
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of Muslim communities, and other civic leaders and individuals in a society can 
communicate against violent extremism and the damage it does to individuals and 
communities.  
In some ways, this thesis builds on what Brad Deardorff proposed in 2010 and 
expands on the notion of requiring improved communication and messaging standards in 
America to deter violent extremism. To date, what has been used the most at countering 
violent extremism in America has been law enforcement tactics. As this thesis has 
reiterated, that tactic is not working. American government policy makers and its 
supporters to deter violent extremism must communicate more effectively to deter 
individuals from going travelling up the staircase to terrorism.  
In the United Kingdom, the RICU is charged with countering the messaging of 
violent extremism and terrorists from around the world who promote threats within its 
borders. A key takeaway for the U.S. government is to house counter-violent extremism 
messaging from a government body similarly. By centralizing the effort to deter or 
influence individuals from a main hub, messages will be more consistent, credible, and 
effective. However, more than merely communicating effectively, many individuals and 
agencies should be communicating the same messages. A holistic, community approach 
that includes individuals from all sectors of society would be most effective at deterring 
violent extremism.  
D. WHOLE OF COMMUNITY APPROACH HAS GREAT POTENTIAL 
The concept of “it takes a village” is no less true in countering violent extremism 
in America. Combining the efforts of trained educators, social workers, and caring 
members of a community, in relationship with local law enforcement, are imperative to 
deterring violent extremism in the United Kingdom. The United States, when executed 
properly and carefully, could be equally effective at using and building its key 
community resources to deter violent extremism.  
The United Kingdom has used educators, messengers from Islamic communities, 
mentors, police officers, and helpful members of the communities who have combined 
their efforts to deter violent extremism. Kieran Ramsey, Assistant Special Agent in 
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Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Boston, said, “the practice of enlisting 
community groups, nonprofit agencies, private businesses, and neighborhood residents 
will better prevent and predict future threats ‘from gangs, drugs, cyber-related crimes, 
and terrorism’ than ‘merely reacting to ones as they appear.’”165  
A more holistic use of communities and the people contained within would be far 
more effective at deterring violent extremism in America. The United Kingdom shows 
how the coordinated and combined efforts of many can help the few in need. Another 
component to deterring violent extremists through a community approach is to recognize 
the signs of radicalization early and use deterrence methods when people are young.  
E. START THEM YOUNG 
The U.K. Channel program offers a multitude of lessons learned for potential use 
in the United States. First, by attempting to provide support to juveniles and young 
people at risk of being potentially drawn into violent extremism, the United States can 
stem the growing tide of young violent extremists. By enabling the successful 
intervention of young people, as referred to in Chapter III, Channel has proven effective 
at deterring violent extremism and reacquainting them back into their communities. 
Youth are surrounded by many kinds of community members. By “enlisting a broad 
spectrum of religious leaders, community leaders, and experts in health and education to 
identify people susceptible to radical ideology and intervene before they become a 
threat,”166 youth can be deterred from violent extremism before it is too late. 
Providing counter-radicalization programs from schools, libraries, and anywhere 
youth can effectively deter violent extremism before individuals reach adulthood. Youth 
have to deal with so much, especially in this globalized world, that it is important to share 
messages of counter violent extremism early on. Just like messaging to influence kids not 
to do drugs, to take care of their bodies, to avoid unsafe sex at a young age, so too should 
messages be shared to deter violent extremism. Part of this program would fall under a 
                                                 
165 Shelley Murphy, “Federal Initiative in Boston Aims to Counter Extremism,” Boston Globe, 
October 3, 2014, 3. 
166 Ibid., 2. 
 56 
Prevent-like program similar to what the United Kingdom does. Certain specialists or 
school educators would be trained and ready to help prevent violent extremism in schools 
and around sections of communities as well.  
F. PREVENTION ENGAGEMENT AND TRAINING 
Training is critical to deterring violent extremism in America. It is imperative to 
train American educators, police officers, and community members to understand, 
recognize, and share counter violent extremism messages. In the United Kingdom, 
Prevent engagement officers are trained to understand and recognize violent extremism. 
The Prevention officers take it a step further by acting as subject matter experts who have 
the tools and know how to best intervene to deter potential violent extremists. In the 
United States, similar programs can be enhanced. By sharing the Community Awareness 
Briefing to broader audiences, American government policymakers and its benefactors 
can share knowledge and tactics to stop violent extremists much sooner. Similar to 
having school resource officers, who are trained law enforcement officers, Prevent 
engagement officers would fill the same role.  
The United Kingdom has had to update the CONTEST, Prevent, and Channel 
programs over time, to appease various stakeholders, due to vocal protests and those 
angry with previous models. The updated changes and measures have added value to the 
programs and helped to create a more efficient, beneficial counter violent extremism 
program than what the Unite States has. Perhaps, the American method to deter violent 
extremism should start with deradicalization programs.  
Good policy proposals to deter violent extremism in America include: 
• deradicalizing 
• communicating effectively  
• embracing a whole of community approach 
• starting them young 
• preventing engagement and training will help 
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These proposals are all effective and significant that American policymakers can 
implement from what the United Kingdom does right to deter violent extremism.  
G. LESSONS LEARNED FROM AUSTRALIA 
Elements of Australia’s Living Safe Together program and their broader Building 
Community Resilience programs have been effective tools to deter violent extremism. 
The United States could take from Australia the importance of individual and community 
resilience and learn how to integrate messages of tolerance and acceptance in an effort to 
build strong and resilient communities. Offering opportunities to change and rehabilitate 
individuals who have gone down the path of violent extremism should be given another 
chance, perhaps. Australian government programs provide the United States an example 
for how to help individuals forgive the past to make the future better.  
As terrorist events are increasing globally, government agencies and citizens 
become more determined to disrupt terrorist activity. Thus, government initiatives to 
build resilience and cohesion throughout communities have been an integral focus for the 
Australian government. After the 2014 Sydney café attack, the global war on terrorism, 
support of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, Australian citizens appreciate what strong communities 
can look like and what they entail. The government in Australia helps by offering the 
knowledge, tools, and infrastructure for stronger communities.  
H. RECOGNIZING HUMAN VULNERABILITIES TO OVERCOME CVE 
Emergency management planners communicate methods to be prepared and have 
emergency supplies available in the event of an attack. By extension, emergency planners 
describe the importance of being strong and resilient in the event of an emergency, in the 
face of adversity. To this end, individuals must also stand firm and be resilient as humans 
being. The same is true of individuals on a daily basis. The Australians have it right when 
they provide training and tools of inclusion, acceptance, and tolerance in the face of U.S. 
differences in communities around the country.  
As humans, sharing difficulties in schools and neighborhoods leads to shared 
opportunities to work together and build relationships. A stronger human understanding, 
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relationship building, and learning and growing from others’ cultures and backgrounds 
create bonds of inclusion in communities. It becomes more difficult to hate someone 
when individuals are building relationships and communities with others who are 
different.  
America could rely more heavily on psychologists, therapists, and other human 
scientists to understand the human component to deter violent extremism better. 
Understanding that individuals are human beings and recognizing how vulnerabilities and 
conditions make individuals act could deter violent extremism better. Once CVE 
practitioners understand the human component better, individuals can get to the root of 
the problem and effectively deter violent extremism with a greater understanding of the 
problem. Humans have weaknesses and reasons for becoming violent extremists, so it is 
up to individuals to understand what motivates others to deter them more effectively. 
From the Australian case study, building resilience against hate, while teaching the 
harmful effects of exclusion, are strong deterrents to violent extremism.  
Messaging effectively and sharing human connections creates understanding and 
shared experiences. These shared experiences provide opportunities for inclusion, 
aspirations, and growth as individuals and communities collectively. Building this 
structure takes time but is worth the effort to help humans grow as people and as 
communities.  
I. BUILDING COMMUNITIES 
In Australia, building individual and community resilience go hand in hand 
oftentimes. Similar to building individual resiliency, building communities’ bonds deters 
violent extremism. Families and communities need to know where they can turn to with 
their concerns.167 Creating resilience in individuals and the community empowers 
individuals to fend off violent extremism that reduces many of the problems societies 
face before they grow. In the face of new and changing threats, the stronger a 
community’s constitution, the more extremism they can ward off. As Ann-Marie 
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Slaughter, the former Public Policy Director for the U.S. State Department noted, “power 
in today’s world derives from connectivity. The ability to engage others, in pursuit of 
common objectives, is now a potent means to achieve American national interests.”168 
While the point from Slaughter is to create connections overseas, it is imperative that 
individuals make strong bonds and connections among communities first, at home. This 
concept of the importance of connection and community must be taken as a way forward 
for the American people.  
Communities grow when its people and neighborhoods work hard to take care of 
their homes and each other. Americans have understood this concept, but reminding them 
of the importance of communities is in order. In today’s globalized world, and thanks to 
the effects of social media, Americans have forgotten about their neighbors and the 
communities in which they live. Americans must remember their neighbors and 
communities first, in an effort to understand individuals better before looking to the 
globalized world for an interpretation of personal needs.  
In reference to the UK lessons learned where “it takes a village,” this viewpoint 
also rings true in this situation. The Australians have created programs that build 
communities and their connections to deter violent extremism. Americans can replicate 
these measures as well. Coming back to neighbors, the connections of small 
communities, and those living nearby will go a long way in deterring violent extremism 
in the long run. Creating positive connections thus enables individuals to look out for one 
another, which leads to building a team spirit among communities. This team concept 
enables building resilient communities.  
In addition to building a positive cohesiveness, Australians take their program a 
step further by messaging that inclusiveness, acceptance, and tolerance for one another 
are important in communities. Once more, it is evident that communicating positively is 
effective at deterring violent extremism.  
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J. COUNTER NARRATIVES OF ACCEPTANCE AND TOLERANCE 
COULD HELP DETER VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AMERICA 
Australia does a great job of effectively train and communicate messages to 
individuals the importance of accepting one another and tolerating others’ beliefs and 
opinions. By integrating new approaches of acceptance and tolerance in counter-narrative 
strategies could help deter violent extremism in America. To this end, stronger opinions, 
messages, and taglines of acceptance and tolerance are needed. Terrorist group messages 
that narrate fear and exclusion, much like what ISIS does and what Al Qaeda perfected, 
place a wedge between individuals and communities.  
By working with leaders of all stripes throughout communities across America, 
communities can create stronger voices willing to rise up and denounce hatred and 
exclusion. Communities need to take it upon themselves to encourage those with strong, 
moderate voices to help spread the word of tolerance, resilience, cooperation, and 
acceptance. These types of messages need to be heard so that individuals can diminish 
the noise of negativity and the call to terrorism. 
It is healthy to share opinions and ideas in communities in America. It is what 
makes individual Americans stronger, resilient, and enduring than others in different 
nations. By extension, those opinions and ideas have become somewhat inflammatory 
and allow individuals to exclude others due to their biases, judgments, and assumptions 
to point out the flaws of others.  
Leaders of all types in a community include mayors, religious leaders, civic 
leaders, congressmen, influential business owners, and several others should begin the 
conversations that include accepting and tolerating those with whom others may disagree 
to include showing respect for individuals even when disagreeing with them. It also 
includes having integrity when speaking with others, being honest, open, and caring 
towards individuals.  
Acceptance of others and their beliefs is what this country was founded upon. By 
strengthening these ideals and speaking about inclusion, openness, and acceptance, it is 
possible to encourage responsible individuals and communities.  
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Individuals seek extremist groups because others have “done them wrong,” they 
have been made to feel weak, and they have been made to feel useless, powerless, and 
stupid. By distributing messages about the importance of tolerance, acceptance, and 
resilience, individuals can fight violent extremism in America by strengthening the 
communities in which they live.  
The Australians have focused efforts on tolerance and acceptance, and by 
extension, forgiveness. By tolerating or accepting the wrongs or mistakes of others, 
communities can move forward towards growth and positivity. To that end, Australian 
policymakers have offered opportunities to rehabilitate and change the lives of former 
violent extremists.  
K. REHABILITATION 
Aside from Australia, other countries offer rehabilitation programs for former 
violent extremists as well. These types of programs offer hope for many individuals and 
communities. In this case study, Australia offers possibilities of “work in a pre-criminal 
space and allow[s] those vulnerable to recruitment or indeed those who have dabbled in 
violent extremist activity to exit, to be reformed and helped along a different path.”169 
Australia demonstrates that those who were violent extremists made mistakes and should 
be offered an opportunity to step away from their past and to try to become a better 
person, under the careful eye of government officials. 
In America, as Jessica Stern stated, “one of our goals must be to make the 
terrorists’ [rehabilitation]… seem less urgent: to demonstrate that humanity that binds us, 
rather than allow our adversaries to emphasize and exploit our differences to provide a 
seemingly clear (but false) identity, at the expense of peace.”170 By offering former 
violent extremists a new chance at life and opportunity, it is possible to deemphasize the 
importance of violent extremists in this world and deter terrorists more easily.  
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Rehabilitating violent extremists offers forgiveness for past wrongs and hurt. 
Individuals can live healthy, vibrant lives when they have a chance to change their evil 
ways or by offering their apologies for having made mistakes. Many individuals across 
societies have made mistakes; some are worse than others. Offering forgiveness to others 
for their mistakes will help create more inclusive and positive societies.  
L. EXPAND TRAINING FOR CITIZENS 
Perhaps, the first step in deterring violent extremism in America should come 
from the Australians sense of training citizens, educators, and others what violent 
extremism is and how to avoid it. The training provides tools and concepts to fend off 
violent extremism, thus providing individuals with an awareness and resilience against 
this behavior. This training includes understanding what terrorism is, what tactics 
individuals use as they become radicalized, who individuals can reach out to for help, and 
offers the tools for building confidence, strength, and resilience in the face of adversity. 
These deterrence methods afford individuals a certain confidence to overcome potential 
recruitment into violent extremism.  
Currently, American government members provide the CAB to select 
communities, but if greatly expanded, it could be far more effective at deterring violent 
extremism. Even just offering awareness training could be effective at helping individuals 
know what terrorism is, what extremist behaviors look like, and how to protect 
themselves and communities from falling prey to violent extremism. Oftentimes, 
individuals just do not know or understand what the problem is, what extremism looks 
and sounds like. Expanding training for citizens, educators, and others who live and work 
in communities could provide useful knowledge to deter violent extremism.  
Training and discussions for understanding the human psyche include providing 
opportunities for individuals to speak with psychologists, therapists, and the like in an 
effort to examine extremist thoughts, ideas, or beliefs. Or, these opportunities may just 
offer individuals a chance to communicate with someone if they are upset, scared, fearful, 
or hurting. These efforts will help individuals who may find refuge in a violent extremist 
organization a chance to just speak about what is bothering them.  
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Good policy proposals to deter violent extremism in America include: 
• recognize human vulnerabilities to overcome CVE 
• build community cohesion 
• counter narratives are imperative to CVE 
• rehabilitate for violent extremists 
• expand training for citizens 
Australia offers the United States some helpful programs that could be useful to 
deter violent extremism. Namely, promoting the benefits of community cohesion and 
personal resilience as enablers to fend violent extremism can go a long way in deterring 
terrorism in the United States. Additionally, offering awareness training and providing 
tools for teachers and school administrators could help in providing early intervention for 
some of the youth in America. Offering incentives to rehabilitate, educate, and influence 
extremists from violence and to provide alternative options, or offer mercy in an attempt 
to change their ways, may guide others to lasting positive change as well.  
M. OVERCOMING THE ISSUE OF THE INTERNET 
As described in previous chapters, the United Kingdom, Australia and the United 
States experience issues with radicalization over the internet because “[t]he Internet 
affords individuals the ability to marinate themselves in the violent jihadi-ideology in the 
early stages of radicalization, and it can be used to facilitate targeting and operational 
planning in the later stages.”171 These opportunities make it difficult to target the 
multiple uses and varieties of platforms on the internet that extremists use to recruit and 
radicalize individuals.  
As of 2011:  
[Anwar al] Awlaki ha[d] a tremendous following worldwide, and, more 
than anyone else, he appears to have capitalized on the capabilities of [the 
web], which he is effectively using for both messaging and recruiting. 
Awlaki’s videos are easily accessible in both private jihadi forums, but a 
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bigger concern is that the videos have proliferated onto other more readily 
accessible [web] platforms, such as YouTube, LiveLeak, and Facebook to 
name a few.172  
These platforms provide an outstanding avenue into the hearts and minds of young 
Muslim teens (mainly male) who are disenchanted because of racism, no jobs or 
opportunities, language difficulties, or problems at home. What is not seen are “bands” of 
disenchanted, radicalized Muslims.  
To deter violent extremism online, which is quite different than in the “real 
world,” the U.S. government must create a proactive counter-violent extremist approach 
embedded with and consistent with any other national strategy. It is not about creating a 
secondary strategy to deter violent extremism in America online. It is about one 
deterrence strategy used across multiple channels.  
Any agency that works to deter violent extremism in America will play a role in 
countering radicalization online. Each has its own platforms and forums that that will 
continue to be monitored. The strategies to deter violent extremists will consist of the 
promotion of counter messaging, sharing messages related to positive ways of life, and 
offering ways and incentives to create healthy, vibrant communities. The messages of 
influence will encourage and enable individuals to speak up and use their voice to counter 
violent extremism across America. To encourage individuals with religious backgrounds, 
non-governmental organizations, and communities of interest, these messages and 
influence tactics will be open to many stakeholders for use. Lessons learned and best 
practices will be shared freely and openly. American government leaders must learn to 
trust those who support deterrence and counter violent extremism activities, and should 
encourage self-regulation to occur online. Obviously, law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies will continue to monitor and defend against extremist behavior, but this 
approach should remain inclusive of individuals who want to play a role to deter violent 
extremism and have the platform available to do so.  
Luckily, “there are a plethora of tools that can be used to highlight and promote 
counter-narrative content that can be tailored to target individuals. Those who are 
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searching for and accessing extremist content, including Google, YouTube and Facebook 
ads, and targeted ads on gaming platforms.”173 Once it is better understood which 
platforms are the most successful at recruiting and radicalizing individuals, we can it is 
then possible to use effective messaging to help deter violent extremism. “The most 
compelling propaganda by those encouraging others to fight shares a number key 
attributes: It tends to use video rather than text, takes full advantage of the linguistic skills 
of members (sometimes even translating suras used to European languages), makes good 
use of music and resonates with western youth culture.”174 
As referred to in the Australian case study, governments can do more to 
deradicalize on the internet. Providing consistent, effective, credible messages to counter 
violent extremism everywhere, including the internet, would deter and influence 
individuals equally and effectively; a great place to start.  
The creation of an integrated approach to countering terrorism across many 
platforms on all types of media must be improved in America. A clear, concise, easy, 
consistent messaging plan against violent extremism in America must exist. America 
needs an overall communications strategy as part of the counterterrorism strategy, which 
addresses national concerns that states and communities across this country can utilize for 
local approaches to the problem. The messaging should be credible, consistent, and 
shared throughout information platforms including print, television, and cyber.  
“One of the areas where governments can make the greatest contribution is in 
helping to build capacity among credible messengers, such a former foreign fighters, the 
victims of violent extremism, those from conflict zones or individuals with influence over 
at risk youth, including young people themselves.”175 It is one concept to communicate 
effectively and well; however, a critical component is through credible messages and 
messengers. As Roslyn Richardson states in the Fighting Fire with Fire: Target Audience 
Responses to Online Anti-Violence Campaign, “governments aren’t the best source to 
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offer compelling counter-narratives, but they can help build the online capacity of 
influential voices in the most affected communities.”176 Whatever approach is taken to 
counter violent extremism online must be consistent across the board. It should 
communicate messages using individuals who are credible, helpful, and effective. 
Certainly, fighting violent extremism has its issues and many challenges. 
Moving beyond their original assumptions that violent extremism could be 
deterred through the use of security enhancements and intelligence capabilities, Australia 
is well poised to change the influencing behaviors of violent extremists, for good. Those 
well trained in detecting radicalization could be prepared to assist in the deradicalization 
of individuals. Offering the same training to community leaders and social workers that is 
offered to teachers and school administrators could be beneficial. By offering individuals 
a way out, through influence and deterrence measures, away from violent extremist 
behavior, can help communities become stronger, better, and more connected over time. 
However, “responsibility for intervention programs should rest with governments and not 
just Muslim community groups or religious leaders. For these programs to have any 
chance of working, [the Australian community] must also acknowledge that cultural and 
religious diversity are integral parts of [the] national identity.”177  
When it comes to deterring radicalization and violent extremism from online 
resources, it can be a difficult and challenging strategy to overcome. Similar to the United 
Kingdom and the United States, Australian citizens are prone to the harmful effects of 
online radicalization. “Australians have featured consistently in ISIL’s regular stream of 
online videos over the past year and used strategically to attract further Western 
recruit.”178 “Direct conversations with frontline fighters in Syria and Iraq, recruiters and 
facilitators are a keystroke away.”179  
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“Most of those who have become radicalised have had some vulnerability in their 
lives that made them receptive to extremist ideology. For most, radicalisation tends to 
take a long time, yet there’s potential for more rapid radicalisation with the level of 
propaganda that’s now available online.”180 Too many cases today illustrate “how the 
internet can become a valuable tool to re-enforce beliefs and assumptions without peer 
challenge to those ideas.”181 
Messaging and providing counter narratives to violent extremism should be 
accessible for deterrence strategies online too. “This approach should be complemented 
by face-to-face engagement, a process of trust building, recognition of the importance of 
selecting the right language to describe the problem, and an understanding of the 
significant differences of attitude that exist within the Muslim community.”182 Both the 
credibility from the government and Muslim communities would grow as they work 
together to counter violent extremism messaging. More follow up should be planned 
alongside community discussions so that as many people as possible can work as one 
community to counter radicalization. However, counter radicalization and moderate 
Muslim voices online are key to fighting the violent extremism that so many countries 
face.  
N. CHALLENGES 
These recommendations thus far may be considered difficult or too soft. 
Currently, however, counter violent extremism strategies in America are lacking effective 
approaches since previous programs have been too heavy-handed and harsh, namely due 
to law enforcement and arrest procedures.  
Programs to counter violent extremism in the United States must always abide by 
and follow the tenets of the U.S. Constitution. By doing so, the Unites States will 
improve its credibility, and possibly, eliminate one reason for a person to become 
disillusioned with the systems currently in place. Creating messages that fall within U.S. 
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constitutional limits while also being effective and credible is the greatest challenge 
‘being faced in America.  
Identifying and adapting effective messaging is challenging because no set way of 
measuring how effectively a certain approach is conveying a message currently exists. 
Tracking the effectiveness of CVE activities is quite difficult. Mostly, “these challenges 
are partly due to the fact that CVE is a relatively recent policy objective.”183 One way to 
overcome this issue is by government use of “online analytical tools and polling data to 
understand which extremist narratives have the greatest impact to better inform their own 
counter-narrative campaigns.”184 The key to overcoming the lack of awareness of 
counter-violent extremism programs is through understanding what works and what does 
not.  
Of key concern is that: 
The success of radicalization prevention is even more challenging to 
evaluate because it requires planners to prove a negative: the number of 
individuals who did not become terrorists because of the program. 
Governments have attempted to set clear metrics to empirically verify the 
effectiveness of their actions, ranging from simple quantitative analyses of 
program participation to more complex indexes seeking to determine the 
level of community engagement.185  
Conflicting goals play a role in countering violent extremism as well. Agencies, 
such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), may have a desire to build a case 
against a potential extremist and see where the trail leads while other groups or agencies, 
such as human rights organizations or community groups, may have the goal of 
intervening early in the process to prevent the radicalization in the first place. “This is 
particularly a problem because U.S. law enforcement has no incentives to stop young 
kids from ruining their lives and every incentive to build cases against them or to recruit 
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them to build cases against their friends.”186 A difference of opinions at federal 
government levels can hinder cases where simple intervention and deterrence measures 
may be more effective. The opinions of the DHS versus the FBI versus the U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement may have other viewpoints. Additionally, it 
creates less animosity when law enforcement does not have to get involved, as seen in the 
case study of the United Kingdom.  
Enabling effective CVE programs in America to date have included too many 
policymakers with too many opinions; it has been quite challenging.  
So far, too many working groups and federal agencies have pointed to each other 
as the lead for deterring violent extremism in America. That needs to stop. Someone must 
take the reins and be the lead to combat violent extremism. It has been too long having no 
chiefs to lead CVE efforts; the focus has been lost with too many irons in the fire.  
Great challenges can be overcome with great efforts. This thesis has shared the 
gravity of the situation to deter violent extremism in America to a great extent. The 
challenges in America to deter violent extremism can be overcome, with hard work and 
by better coordinating efforts. Implementing these strategy concepts is the key to creating 
great change to deter violent extremism in America.  
O. IMPLEMENTATION 
Challenges affect how these policy proposals can be implemented in the United 
States. Implementation can occur on any level in America; some programs, when 
implemented at the local level, can have the greatest effect for positive change.  
It would benefit Americans to have one “CVE Czar” focused and acting as a 
repository for CVE knowledge, who has an understanding, as well as the capability to 
move CVE programs forward. This CVE Czar would answer directly to the President of 
the United States on all CVE matters and likely work from or near the DHS. This CVE 
Czar would likely come from the DHS, the Department of State, or even better, would be 
a former Public Affairs or influence operations officer from the military or state agency. 
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Since many of these proposals contained within this thesis offer more soft power 
strategies, someone with experience in influence operations and public affairs tactics may 
be best for the CVE Czar. This thesis does not advocate for the creation of any new type 
of federal agency or more umbrella organizations, under the CVE Czar. This thesis does 
advocate for an update to current agencies and structures.  
The United States could manage a similar UK OSCT-like structure at the federal 
level, which would act as the “main hub” for all counterterrorism strategies for the 
federal government. Creating an extension of the NCTC or the DHS, which would house 
this CVE strategy and its components, would enable a top-down approach to reach into 
states and municipalities for action.  
Next, many states regions around the country have fusion centers, which are 
information-sharing centers for intelligence and law enforcement agencies. These 
agencies could be reconfigured in a UK RICU-like state to enable the CVE Czar to work 
policies and procedures down from the federal level into states and territories. These 
RICU-like units would answer to the governor, in a similar fashion that already exists for 
fusion centers.  
Then, a “whole of community” committee would fall under the RICU structure to 
enable and encourage cities, towns, and communities to buy into policies and strategies to 
deter violent extremism at the local level. These city-based whole of community 
committees would consist of local police department members, the mayor, community 
leaders, social workers, supervisors or schools, religious leaders, and more members who 
have a stake in deterring violent extremism in communities across the country.  
Current working groups that come from various sections of the U.S. government 
have not been effective. No one person has been labeled a leader to deter violent 
extremism in America. That situation needs to change. By anointing someone as the head 
to combat violent extremism in America, it is then possible to remove the groupthink 
mentality that has been stagnant concerning CVE efforts thus far. A CVE Czar could 
initiative and administer this top-down approach, while encouraging bottom-up 
information in return. Additionally, information, best practices, and lessons learned could 
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be sent up the chain of command to the CVE Czar, who in turn, could share the 
information back out to the OSCT-like structure, to the fusion center/RICU-like structure, 
and into the whole of community committees for action.  
The human psychology, vulnerabilities, and conditions to persuade individuals to 
do something can be extremely difficult to achieve.  
Counterradicalization programs are an immensely complex and 
controversial subject. They touch on extremely sensitive issues, such as 
religion, identity, and integration. They can be highly intrusive, impinge 
on civil liberties, and risk further alienating the very group they seek to 
reach. Despite these enormous difficulties, a preventative approach and a 
deradicalization effort are necessary components of a comprehensive 
counterterrorism policy.187  
The CVE Czar would be tasked with encouraging and inviting leaders in religious 
groups, communities, and schools to create a dialogue around what conditions and 
vulnerabilities Americans must overcome to deter violent extremism. For example, 
“when a mosque and synagogue conduct an interfaith event, it should not be framed as a 
counterradicalization issue, it should simply focus on building interfaith relationships 
because that is the ‘right thing to do.’”188 Merely bringing together groups of various 
types, faiths, and ideas can have a profoundly positive effect on a community. Overtime, 
strategies to deter violent extremism will continue to grow. These best practices and 
lessons learned would provide the basis for a stronger national approach to counter 
violent extremism in America.  
Coordinating training and shared opportunities in communities can make 
implementation procedures easy and smooth. For example, “the Islamic Council is 
seeking advice from psychologists, sociologists and computer experts on how to develop 
the training program, with workshops, and possibly interactive educational apps for 
smartphones, that would be implemented at mosques throughout New England, and 
eventually nationwide.”189  
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Other types of potential implementation methods include building “partnerships 
between the federal government and local law enforcement, educational and community 
groups that are better positioned to detect potential militants in their own midst and to 
derail those young men and women from the path of radicalization before they turn 
violent.”190 Implementation of these policies and strategies can occur in a variety of 
ways. Many of them can take place in small communities, as grass-roots efforts, and 
grow from there into cities, states, and regionally. As long as methods are effective, 
credible, and meaningful for communities, the implementation methods should be simple.  
At the federal level, the “CVE Czar” referred to earlier would be better positioned 
to implement roles and responsibilities for interested individuals working to counter 
violent extremism. These interested individuals include stakeholders from the federal 
government, states, and local communities. The CVE Czar as the leader would be more 
effective in deterring violent extremism from the federal level, with efforts, ideas, 
concepts, and plans trickling down into states and local communities. Or even from the 
bottom up, to one point person who can further share lessons learned, best practices, and 
effective methods.  
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VI. CONCLUSION/EPILOGUE 
Darkness cannot drive out darkness: only light can do that. Hate cannot 
drive out hate: only love can do that. 
~ Marin Luther King, Jr. 
 
Too many shocking terrorist attacks have occurred on U.S. soil in the last 17 
years. The impetus for this thesis was the Boston Marathon bombing of April 2013. 
Americans cannot sit by and watch while more terrorist attacks occur within U.S. 
borders. The American government and communities have more tools in their arsenal to 
deter violent extremism than ever before. The “military, police, and intelligence measures 
still dominate among practitioners countering the immediate needs which stem from 
violent extremism, but prevention is equally necessary, and governments across the world 
are looking for ways to prevent violent extremism and its predecessor, radicalization.”191 
This thesis sought to understand what other countries, namely the United Kingdom and 
Australia, are doing to deter violent extremism in their borders.  
While countries in this study experience challenges in difficulties in fighting 
terrorism and violent extremism, hope also remains. Australia is working hard to 
overcome the terrorist ideologies that threaten its country and way of life. “There may be 
many within our communities able to develop potent counter-narratives to ISIL and other 
extremist groups, but don’t have the capacity to promote that message to a wider 
audience. Governments and the private sector can assist in providing the skills needed for 
natural community influencers to emerge.”192 
By effectively messaging, the U.S. government and individuals can be more 
influential and effective in deterring violent extremism within this nation’s borders. 
“Research has shown that the three vital factors in successfully reaching target audiences 
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through counterspeech are the message, the messaging, and the messenger.”193 
Americans, government officials and individuals, must do more to message and 
communicate correctly with adversaries who seek to harm Americans.  
American government lawmakers can take U.S. policies of diversity, tolerance, 
and acceptance farther in America. A strong, cohesive national CVE strategy is seriously 
lacking. “In both North America and in Europe, more constructive policies must be 
developed to manage diversity. There are serious flaws in the current policies, both of the 
assimilation and multiculturalism varieties.”194 It is now extremely necessary to build 
strong and resilient people and communities. By understanding the differences between 
individuals, American communities can grow better with healthy policies that encourage 
individuals to look after each other, care, and serve one another.  
It is imperative to enable messaging strategies to encourage CVE “to recalibrate 
the message, the messenger, medium and method by which they counter extremism.”195 
American current policies and practices need to be completely overhauled to speak 
credibly and effectively to deter violent extremism. “Ultimately, terrorism is a moral 
problem with psychological underpinnings; the challenge is to prevent disaffected youth 
and others from becoming engaged in the morality of terrorist organizations.”196 It 
should not be an about “us versus you” or “bad versus right” scenario, but about human 
beings and how individuals can live together in this world.  
Further research is needed to understand how to implement counter narrative 
messages into the school system and throughout communities, the role of the media and 
other individuals who have a role to pay in deterring violent extremism, and the 
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“psychological processes influencing behavior [which] are subjective interpretations of 
material conditions, perceptions of fairness, and adequacy of identity.”197  
This thesis explained what challenges the United States is experiencing when 
countering terrorism in its borders. By attempting to learn and study what other countries 
are doing to stem the growing tide of violent extremism in the United Kingdom and 
Australia, this thesis has proposed possibilities for the future of American policies to 
deter violent extremism under this nation’s authority.  
Now, American policymakers must “pursu[e] a more sustainable approach that 
prioritizes targeted counterterrorism operations, collective action with responsible 
partners, and increased efforts to prevent the growth of violent extremism and 
radicalization that drives increased threats.”198 Now is the time to match words and 
deeds. All Americans must help this country strive to “become the strongest competitor 
and the most influential player in a deeply inter-connected global system, which requires 
that we invest less in defense and more in sustainable prosperity and the tools of effective 
global engagement.”199 All Americans must match words with actions and eliminate the 
ambiguity that brought this country to this point. It is time all Americans communicate 
what they mean, build strong communities, and help those who have done wrong with 
forgiveness. This is a call to America; the time for action is now.  
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